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The purpose of this study is to analyze the policy 
reports and recommendations of the Carnegie Commission on the 
Future of Higher Education, and to report such conclusions as 
an appropriate analysis will yield. A brief review of the 
Carnegie Commission, its membership, the objectives for which 
it was established, and the extent of its activities, will 
suggest not only the importance of such a study, but also the 
form that it should take.
First announced in January, 1967, the Commission was 
established by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching.^ It was placed under the chairmanship of Clark 
Kerr, one whose prominence in American higher education was 
established during his presidency of the University of
l"Clark Kerr Heads Study of Ü. S. Higher Education," 
Publishers' Weekly, February 6, 1967, p. 47.
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California between the years 1958 and 1967. An author as 
well as an administrator, Kerr continues to rank among the 
nation's outstanding spokesmen for higher e d u c a t i o n . ^
Also serving on the Commission are William Friday, 
David D. Henry, James A. Perkins, and Stanley J. Heywood, 
all of whom are, or have been, presidents of important 
public institutions. Theodore Hesburgh, Katherine McBride, 
and Nathan Pusey are, or have been, similarly associated 
with certain of the nation's most prestigious private 
institutions. Most of these people are hardly less distin­
guished than Kerr himself. The Commission also includes 
the names of people outside education fully as distinguished 
in their own areas. Most notable of these is William W. 
Scranton, former governor of Pennsylvania, former congress­
man, and one-time contender for the Republican nomination 
as candidate for President. Mr. Scranton was also chairman 
of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest.
2Who's Who in America (Chicago: Marquis, 1972), 
p. 1698. The information on the following members of the 
Commission was also taken from this same source: William 
Friday, p. 1078; David D. Henry, p. 1408; Stanley J. Heywood, 
p. 1428; Theodore Hesburgh, p. 1421; Nathan Pusey, p. 2561; 
William W. Scranton, p. 2832; Carl Kaysen, p. 1667; Ralph W. 
Hesse, p. 248; Clifton W. Phalen, p. 2486; Kenneth Keniston, 
p. 1689; David Riesman, p. 2650; Kenneth Tollett, p. 3185; 
and Norton Simon, p. 2915.
Information on Joseph Cosand, Eric Ashby, and 
Patricia Roberts Harris was obtained from the foreword of 
the following publication: Carnegie Commission on the Future
of Higher Education, Report of the Commission, Priorities 
for Action: Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on 
Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1973), 
p̂ i ixf. The official membership of the Commission was also 
identified by this same reference.
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The Commission also includes Eric Ashby, English 
educator; Joseph P. Cosand, former Deputy Commissioner for 
Higher Education, U. S. Office of Education, and now Profes­
sor and Director, Center for Higher Education, University of 
Michigan; Patricia Roberts Harris, educator, attorney, and 
former Ambassador to Luxembourg; Carl Kaysen, economist, and 
Director, Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, New 
Jersey; and Ralph W. Besse, and Clifton W. Phalen, business 
executives. Kenneth Keniston, psychologist, David Riesman, 
social scientist, and Kenneth Tollett, former professor of 
law and now Professor of Education, Howard University, appear 
to be the representatives of the professoriate in that it is 
they who, among this group, have had careers that are so 
described. The Commission is made up primarily of those whose 
background has been higher education administration, business, 
and government. Norton Simon, business executive, is the one 
member of the Commission whose biographical statement in 
Who's Who in America does not state that he completed an 
undergraduate degree program, or that he ever attended college. 
All members of the Commission have exercised leadership in 
higher education in either professional or non-professional 
capacities.
At the time of the Commission's founding, the Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching announced that this 
group was instructed by it "to analyze how Americans can 
afford the quantity and quality of education they are likely
4
to demand in the years to come." It was further announced 
that "this group would not aim for a supersolution . . . but 
would consider a number of different ways in which the 
nation's incredibly diverse system of higher education might 
develop over the next decade or t w o . B y  the Commission's 
own account it was instructed to "examine and make recommen­
dations regarding the many vital issues facing higher educa­
tion in the United States as we approach the year 2000."4 
More recently it has reported its general purpose as being:
to make a systematic appraisal of higher education and 
to suggest guidelines for its continuing development.
At the Commission's birth in 1967 it was given the 
mission of obtaining information, analyzing issues, and 
advising the leaders of our institutions of higher 
education, decision makers in and out of government, 
and the general public on directions for the f u t u r e . ^
From these statements it must be deduced that the Commis­
sion's mandate is quite general, and that it could proceed 
in almost any direction and remain within this purview.
However, it should be noted that the two-fold 
purpose of (1) examining and appraising, including research 
and analysis, and (2). suggesting, or .recommending guidelines,
3 "Clark Kerr Heads Study of U. S. Higher Education," 
Publishers' Weekly. February 6, 1967, p. 47 (quoting Alan 
Pifer).
4Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality: New 
Levels of Federal Responsibility" for Higher Education (New 
York; McGraw-Hill, 1968), reference from foreword; 
unpaginated.
Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, An Important Announcement from the Carnegie Commission 
on Higher Education, an undated, unpaginated brochure.
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and specifically advising on directions for the future, 
clearly relates the work of the Commission to the ongoing 
process of goal formulation for the future of higher educa­
tion. The stance of the Commission in this regard will be 
of particular interest to this study. For its proposals and 
recommendations, if they are to have any effective meaning, 
will either support practices which are normative for higher 
education in the United States, or they will be stated in 
such a manner that they will require modification or 
displacement of certain present norms in order to be put 
into effect. It is in this same connection that any unity 
or consistency in the Commission's point of view may be 
observed, and about which any conclusions may be drawn.
A careful study of the Commission, its point of view 
and recommendations, appears to be in order for a number of 
reasons. The first of these is the prestige of the Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. It has a long 
record of interest in education, including higher education, 
and has become well established as a source for funding 
special projects in educational research. The second has to 
do with the prestige of the Commission itself, the very 
prominence of whose members requires that their opinions be 
reviewed and evaluated. A third reason has to do with the 
extent of financial and human resources applied to this 
enterprise, which finally resulted in the expenditure of no 
less than six million dollars and the publication of more
6
than one hundred books and monographs.® An effort such as 
this cannot be ignored, and it can be expected that these 
publications will be the object of continuing interest.
A final reason has to do with the breadth of the Commission's 
interest as well as the extent of its activities. It has 
studied and reported on many areas. Such an extensive effort, 
if taken seriously, can have a profound influence on higher 
education during the approaching years, even for decades.
The Commission's stance, or point of view will be 
determined, and judgments made as to its general adequacy, on 
the basis of the following interrogative problem statement:
To what extent has the Carnegie Commission on the Future of 
Higher Education accomplished its task through the exercise 
of sound principles, consistent use of theoretical constructs 
or models; or if not, then to what extent have its policy 
statements been influenced by unsupported assumptions as to 
fact, by value judgments, and incomplete or fallacious 
arguments?
A critical analysis will be helpful in estimating the 
soundness of the Commission's proposals and recommendations 
for the future, and in determining what the various stances
^Reported by Donald McDonald in "A Six Million 
Dollar Misunderstanding," Center Magazine, September/October 
1973, p. 32. The publications of the Carnegie Commission are 
listed in the Chronicle of Higher Education, October 9, 1973, 
p. 18. There are 104 titles in all.
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by the academic community, government and its agencies, and 
the public should be. These are the groups to which the 
Commission has addressed itself, and from whom it can 
rightly expect a candid response.
Chapter Two will review the literature pertinent to 
this study. The delimitations of this study will be set 
forth and secondary sources reviewed. Criterion sources 
from which the analytical method and criterion principles 
have been developed will be introduced.
Chapter Three will present the approach to the 
problem as stated above. This will include the criterion 
principles of analysis and an analytical model based upon 
means-end relationships. The separate dimensions of the 
model provide the steps (Illustration I on page 38) to be 
followed in the analysis, as follows:
Chapters Four and Five will analyze the expressed
purposes and priorities of the Carnegie Commission.
Chapter Six will analyze the implications for resource 
use that follow from the Commission's presuppo­
sitions as to meaning.
Chapter Seven will analyze the same implications for 
governance.
Chapter Eight will analyze the implications for the
nature, scope, and functions of higher education —  
the relationships of learning.
Chapter Nine will present the conclusion to this study.
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The literature pertinent to this study falls into 
three categories: primary sources, secondary sources, and 
criterion sources. The primary sources will be the subject 
of this study. The secondary sources are those statements 
by independent observers, the important ones of which will be 
reviewed for specific suggestions as to strengths and weak­
nesses of the proposals and recommendations of the Carnegie 
Commission. The criterion sources consist of those writings 
in logical analysis from which a research method has been 
derived, and by which the research problem will be developed.
Primary Sources
The primary sources will consist of those policy 
reports, or policy statements, in which the Carnegie Commission 
has formally stated its position, and its recommendations, for 
the future of higher education in the United States. The 
first of these statements. Quality and Equality: New Levels 
of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education, was issued 
in December, 1968. A revised edition was issued in 1970.
8
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The series was concluded with the publication of Priorities 
for Action; Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on 
Higher Education, November, 1973. Twenty-two such policy 
reports were released, not including the one revision. A 
complete list of these monographs appears in the Biblio­
graphy for this analysis. Published by McGraw-Hill Book 
Company of New York, New York, as Reports with Recommenda­
tions, this series will be referred to for convenience as 
policy reports, or policy statements. This is because they 
set forth the official point of view of the Carnegie Commis­
sion, and its many formal recommendations. They therefore 
represent those ideas for which the Commission must accept 
responsibility, and by which it must be judged. Hence this 
analysis is delimited to include these statements as its 
subject, or research material.^
The Commission has also sponsored the preparation of 
sixty-four Research Reports and nineteen Technical Reports. 
The analysis is delimited to exclude these two series 
because they were prepared by commissioned authors under 
contract whose views are not necessarily those of the 
Carnegie Commission. Thus the policy statements are the 
only primary source documents for the study of the problem 
statement.
^Complete and separate lists of the Reports with 
Recommendations, sponsored Research Reports, and Technical 
Reports appear in Priorities for Action: Final Report of the 
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, pp. 191-197. The 




Beginning in the year 1970, the policy statements 
and other reports prepared under the sponsorship of the 
Carnegie Commission began to appear with some frequency. 
Secondary sources as to their content also began to appear, 
a few of which are sufficiently penetrating in their insight 
to merit some discussion.
The first to be considered is an essay presented to 
the National Conference of the American Association for 
Higher Education in March, 1972, by Alan Wolfe.^ According 
to him the Commission is a voice of the higher education 
establishment, it deals with symptoms not causes, and that 
we therefore cannot expect effective results from its work.
In Wolfe's opinion the approach of the Commission to the 
problems of higher education is subjective. It is not scien­
tific. Conclusions have been reached on the basis of what 
people think, which is to assume that truth is a matter of 
relatively informed or uninformed collective opinion. With 
some degree of opinion of his own Wolfe claims that American 
higher education has never really been good, but that it was 
not a problem until students and junior faculty created the 
campus disturbances of the sixties. He adds that in light
^Alan Wolfe, "The Carnegie Commission: Voice of the 
Es tab1ishme n t ," The Expanded Campus: Current Issues in Higher 
Education, 1972, ed. by Dyckman W. Vermilye (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 1972), pp. 28-34.
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of this the Commission wishes not to reform higher education,
q"but people's attitudes toward higher education," presumably 
in its present form and as to its present substance.
Wolfe also criticizes the Commission for that which 
he describes as the "selective definition of terms which runs 
throughout these r e p o r t s . " 4  He offers as an example its dis­
cussion of the politicization of the university. So long as 
it has been a status quo institution it has been apolitical, 
from which it follows that any attack upon the status quo 
from within institutions of higher education represents the 
trend toward politicization, Wolfe chooses to invert this 
argument on the grounds that the status quo so conceived 
represents instead a convenient political arrangement with 
the higher learning being one of those activités presently 
upholding it. He further argues that attacks upon this 
status quo arrangement are in effect acts of depolitici­
zation. Given Wolfe's point of view, his criticism holds; 
but given the Commission's stance, its argument holds equally 
well. At best, Wolfe has ridiculed the practice of selective 
definition by making use of it. What he has possibly missed, 
and the Commission also, is that insufficient definition 
results in a faulty analysis.
^ Ibid., p. 29.
4lbid.
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The most important of Wolfe's criticisms of the 
Commission is "its failure to be theoretical, to place things 
in their political context, to examine causes, to be histori­
cal —  in short, to analyze what is wrong with higher educa- 
5tion." But the consequences of an approach which is theore­
tical, historical, and analytical may, or may not, prove to 
be those that Wolfe wishes to expect. He perceives an unjust 
society, higher education a subservient part of it, thus 
standing in a relationship the radical nature of which the 
Carnegie Commission policy statements leave untouched.
Aside from Wolfe's judgment as to the condition of American 
higher education (which he does not think is good), in a 
society (which he does not think is just), his criticism may 
have merit. However the general condition of higher education 
and its social relationships are to be judged, this cannot 
properly be done until all significant relationships have been 
radically examined, until higher education has been subjected 
to a thoroughly critical analysis.
A more recent commentary is that by Norman Birnbaum.^ 
Forthright as to his own value judgments, Birnbaum identifies 
with those who have been disappointed with the Commission 
policy statements for one of two reasons. On the one hand
5 Ibid. p. 30.
^"Politics of the Future," Change, November, 1973 
p p . 28—37.
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are those who would prefer to look forward to a more critical 
university than that which would emerge from the recommenda­
tions of the Carnegie Commission, and on the other there are 
those who would wish to look to a new multiversity of the 
future appropriating to itself a great deal more social and 
political s i g nificance—  "a new kind of Third Estate, able 
to dispense with a revolution as it installed itself in
7power and privilege."
Birnbaum claims instead that the reader is caught up 
in the lengthening shadow of the multiversity as conceived by 
Clark Kerr on an earlier occasion. Hardly critical, hardly 
revolutionary, it is all things to all men, as it was accord­
ing to The Uses of the University, written by Kerr in the 
year 1963. As to the Commission:
The burden of its entire analysis is that a nation's 
education largely depends on its economic «snd social 
trends. An industrial society requires knowledge and 
knowers: the educational system provides both.®
Birnbaum perceives this as being a condition which excludes
the capability of acting independently, critically, or of
allowing the activities of higher education to significantly
influence the patterns of American culture. Instead the
nation's colleges and universities are seen essentially as
uncritical servants of other forces within the social system.
7 lbid. p. 28.
®Ibid.
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Birnbaum charges that Clark Kerr has a fondness for 
economic imagery, and that this imagery has found its way 
into the policy statements of the Commission. But at the 
same time Birnbaum, with Kerr, has possibly missed the 
significance of the frequent economic references, even though 
hints to such are provided by some of Birnbaum’s other 
observations. He claims for example that the Carnegie 
Commission fails to entertain the prospect that "political 
justice and the unlimited growth of American capitalism may 
be in conflict."® In still another reference he charges that 
the "corporate domination of our public life"10 is not neces­
sarily to the best interest of American democracy. Economic 
growth and corporate domination are perceived by Birnbaum as 
conditions which the policy statements blandly accept, even 
their influence upon higher education. This point, coupled 
with this same critic's prior observation that higher educa­
tion's social function is subservient and complementary, has 
important implications for this analysis.
W. Roy Niblett, a British scholar, has reacted to two 
basic themes appearing throughout the policy reports —  
quality and equali t y . H  Niblett holds that quality, as this 
term applies to academic standards, is necessarily in tension
9 Ibid.
lOlbid., p. 30.
ll"The Commission's Work: A view from Abroad,"
Change, November, 1973, pp. 38-44.
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with the principle of equality of access to institutions of
higher education. Educational egalitarianism for the masses
at the college level and learning excellence do not go
together, and the former can be achieved only at son e
sacrifice to the latter. He charges the Commission with
being vague as to the meaning of quality. Its understanding
cannot be taken for granted, and consequently there is some
12confusion as to the meaning of this term.
Another criticism of Niblett's is closely related. 
This has to do with the rejection of the concept of general 
education and offering in its place the concept of a "broad 
learning experience." General education is only vaguely 
described, its successor vaguely conceived, with the conse­
quence that the Commission's discussion of this issue is
13lacking in precision and depth.
Niblett also criticizes the Commission for proposing 
as a part of the broad learning experience the consideration 
of "alternative cultural models" to that which prevails in 
western civilization, particularly as real options to our 
own. He believes that the Commission hardly means what it 
has said in this case, for this would logically introduce 
both Soviet and Chinese Communism as live possibilities for 





In response to these vague conceptions of key terms, 
and the making of proposals as for example "broad learning 
experience," without taking measure of the consequences for 
its argument, Niblett has his own suggestion for making 
improvements —  "The Commission needs to become aware of its 
own hidden assumptions, and to teaSe them out."^^ He thus 
implies that the Commission is not fully aware of the reasons 
for the positions that it has taken, not fully aware of the 
meanings of many of its proposals. It follows that certain 
meanings may be incomplete, some contradictory, and some of 
rather unexpected consequence. To the extent that this may 
be so it represents an area for further study.
The most severe criticism of the Carnegie Commission
16has come from Donald McDonald. He regards not only the
policy statements, but also the Sponsored Research Reports,
as inferior when compared to other contemporary treatments
of the nature of higher education in the United States. He
charges that the policy statements in particular are "smooth
and serene," but do not represent a dialogue among the
members of the Commission. They are "light on criticism and
17heavy on recommendation," because the Commission was more 
interested in having an impact than in conducting a study
15 Ibid., p. 44.
Six Million Dollar Misunderstanding," The 
Center Magazine, September/October, 1973, pp. 32-52.
l?Ibid., p. 33.
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into the essence of higher education. Interestingly enough,
Kerr has admitted that this was indéed the strategy of the
Commission, and on the occasion of his visit to the Center
for the Study of Democratic Institutions in the spring of
181973, he defended this as the proper strategy. This deci­
sion, according to McDonald, has resulted in making "whatever 
else the Commission has decided to do —  . . . a waste of
time on a scale of monumental proportions and leaves the
19
Commission's study without any center of gravity."
McDonald takes issue with the Commission's pristine
definition of the academic life —  having to do with the
intellect, rationality, objectivity, logic, preservation and
transmission of culture —  which, he claims, is unassailable
except on the grounds that nowhere in higher education do
20these conditions truly exist. In a similar fashion the 
Commission upholds teaching as being second to none in
importance. Also, in similar fashion, McDonald levels his
criticism again. He charges that because there is no 
"delineation of the art of teaching, why it is indispensable, 
or the actual treatment of teachers, its recommendations 
read more like the obligatory obeisances which university 





three years, and which everyone recognizes for what they are
21and promptly ignores.” In fairness to the Commission it 
should be noted that the failure to analyze the nature and 
function of teaching is an issue quite aside from whether an 
attempt is being made to mollify the professorial guild with 
rhetoric. The latter is hardly appropriate as a criticism 
because the reader cannot really claim to divine motives.
But it is most appropriate to call the Commission to task if 
it has taken an idealistic conception of the university as 
fact, or has failed to thoroughly study and report on the 
essence of the learning enterprise, including the state of 
the art of teaching.
In summary, it can be said that there is general 
agreement among the critics on certain points. This holds 
for the claim that the policy statements are lacking in 
clarity and meaning, that meanings and facts appear to have 
been taken for granted especially as this applies to basic 
concepts and key terms. Wolfe's charges of subjectivity and 
selective definition illustrate the point, as does McDonald's 
claim that the Commission holds to an unreal and idealistic 
conception of higher education.
There is also general agreement as to how the 
Commission has perceived the relationship of higher education 
to the larger society. Its role is not a critical one, but
B^Ibid., p. 41.
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subservient, a point which is consistent with the claim, 
particularly of Birnbaum, that neither is the Commission 
very critical of higher education.
The taking of meanings and facts for granted would 
add credence to the charge of Niblett that the Commission 
needs to examine its own assumptions. Confusion as to 
meaning, as to fact, as to functions and relationships, 
could well proceed from unstated and unexamined assumptions. 
To the degree that the opinions of the critics are sound, 
they are in support of the purpose of this analysis, which 
is to discover and set forth those assumptions.
Criterion Sources
The criterion sources for this study are selected
from the writings of three authors: Alfred Jules Ayer, Irving
M. Copi, and Charles Sanders Peirce. Ayer will be used
primarily for the contributions of his principle of verifica-
22tion and for his definition of a significant statement.
Copi will be used for reference to the basic principles of 
23logic, and Peirce for his contribution to the understanding 
22Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic 
(New York: Dover Publications, 1946), pp. 33-45.
Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1965)1
20
of the nature of m e a n i n g . F u r t h e r  reference will be made 
to these authors as each makes his contribution to the 
formulation of the research criteria, or principles of 
analysis, as they will be called in this study.
^^Charles Sanders Peirce, Philosophical Writings of 
Peirce, Ed. by Justus Buchler (New York: Dover Publications, 
1955), pp. 33-35.
CHAPTER III
THE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM
The problem statement clearly calls for the method 
of induction, of advancing from particulars to the whole in 
which they are bound together, from words and concepts to 
the general conclusions according to which all antecedent 
particulars may be expected to be in agreement. The commis­
sion's stance will initially be accepted on its own terms.
It follows that words and concepts must be studied in order 
to determine those meanings which emerge in connection with 
their usage by the Commission. The same must also hold for 
the development of the Commission's arguments. They must be 
taken as they stand and for what they reflect.
The Principles of Analysis 
Toward this end the problem statement will now be 
supplemented with a series of subordinate questions designed 
to inquire of the internal relationships which are presumed 
to exist in the policy statements of the Carnegie Commission. 
These presupposed relationships will subsequently be formulated 
into principles of analysis, which will in turn be used to
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treat the problem statement set forth in the Introduction to 
this analysis. Those principles will likewise serve as inde­
pendent criteria according to which the policy statements 
will be assessed. The subordinate originating questions are 
as follows:
First, what are the presuppositions as to meaning of the 
determinative words, expressions, and concepts 
employed by the Commission?
Second, what are the assumptions as to principle inherent 
in the stance of the Commission?
Third, what are the assumptions as to fact?
Fourth, what are the fallacies?
These interrogatives embrace seven basic principles 
which will now be further discussed. The first such prin­
ciple is that of meaning, and is intended in this case to 
express certain categories of relationships. In its broadest 
sense it may denote the relationship of cause to effect, but 
more precisely of means to ends, and objects to their use.
In this analysis the principle of meaning will be taken as 
applying to the relationship of an abstraction to its refer­
ence —  of words, signs, and symbols to that which they repre­
sent. The exercise of this principle is important because 
one cannot assume prior to the analysis any degree of strin­
gency on the part of a writer. He may, or may not, have 
defined his terms, or have adhered strictly to
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precise definitions of his own formulation or to those of a 
standard reference. Meaning is a function of usage, of that 
which words and statements are employed to communicate.^ It 
is with this principle in mind that those words, expressions, 
and concepts essential to the Commission's position will be 
studied in context. Reasoning from usage, the Commission's 
presuppositions as to meaning will be inferred and set forth. 
The principle of meaning will thus be used to treat the first 
of the originating questions —  as to the meaning of the 
determinative words, expressions, and concepts employed by 
the Commission.
The second principle of analysis is that of logical 
significance, and inheres in the relationship of an antece­
dent to its consequent, or a premiss to the conclusion drawn 
therefrom. This principle is close in meaning to that which 
Peirce has described as a leading principle —  that habit of 
action whereby the reasoner moves from a premiss to a conclu­
sion. Peirce further identifies a leading principle as a 
"proposition of which the antecedent should describe all 
possible premisses upon which it could operate, while the con­
sequent should describe how the conclusion to which it would
2lead would be determinately related to those premisses."
Peirce develops a similar, though not identical, posi­
tion in How to Make Our Ideas Clear, in Philosophical Writings 
of Peirce, ed. by Justus Buchler (New York: Dover Publications, 
1955) pp. 23-41.
^ Ibid. p. 133.
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It is an expression of form as well as substance. This point 
can be illustrated by a particular instance of a leading 
principle, of the form,
If P, then Q,
as it applies to a specific substantive condition. Given a 
particular case of P, then what conclusion must necessarily 
follow? Logical significance is offered as a descriptor, or 
criterion statement, of propositions satisfying this condi­
tion. As such it will also be offered as the characteristic 
of those presuppositions and assumptions which must necessarily 
hold given the stance, the proposals and recommendations, of 
the Carnegie Commission.
It should be anticipated that the Commission will not 
be preoccupied with formal argument, and that premisses will 
be taken as understood. That which must be the case for a 
given conclusion to hold will accordingly be set forth. The 
identification of these antecedent conditions will satisfy 
the second of the originating questions: What are the assump­
tions as to principle inherent in the stance of the Commis­
sion? The leading principle, as a principle, will be used 
to treat according to Its converse, which is fallacy, those 
propositions offered in support of a point for which they 
have no logical significance. They will be so identified in 
this negative fashion.
Just as there may be assumption as to principle, there 
may also be assumption as to fact. Assumptions as to principle
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are those that attach controlling significance to beliefs, 
commitments, or theoretical statements that are taken as hold­
ing aside from thé question of factuality. But assumptions 
as to meaning, and any other assumptions, may be fully as 
contingent upon fact as on principle. Therefore the third 
principle of analysis is that of empirical significance, and 
is a criterion of the relationship of an express or implied 
proposition and the supporting evidence. That which is 
empirically significant is that for which sufficient evidence 
has been cited or there is sufficient common knowledge. This 
principle embraces in part Ayer's criterion of significance 
by making such a matter of observation. It nonetheless 
differs from Ayer's principle of verification in that the 
principle of significance is to be understood in this 
analysis as embracing the principle of verification only in 
the a posteriori sense of that which has been sufficiently
3
observed to be taken as fact.
Conversely that which is taken as fact but not 
verified, yet at the same time verifiable, will be so labelled —  
as verifiable in principle in the same sense of Ayer's use of 
this expression. The position is thus taken that a proposi­
tion, unless it be expressly proposed on an experimental basis, 
should rest upon established fact. The principle will therefore 
be used to treat the third of the originating questions —
3Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic 
(New York: Dover Publications, 1946) pp. 33-45.
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both to identify and make a judgment about the Carnegie 
Commission's assumptions as to fact.
The fourth principle of analysis is that of validity. 
As with logical significance, this is a function of syllo­
gistic relationship —  a conclusion to its premisses, a 
consequent to its antecedent, a point of view to any neces­
sary preconditions. The principle of validity is to be 
understood as meaning no more, and no less, than its appli­
cation to syllogisms. It differs from empirical signifi­
cance, and logical significance in particular, in that the 
latter are defined here as characteristics of premisses. 
Validity is a characteristic of the argument as a whole.
Given the truth of premisses, the valid argument is the one 
in which the offered conclusion must necessarily follow. If 
the necessary conclusion does not follow, but some conclusion 
other than the necessary consequence of the conditions 
expressed in the premisses, then the argument is invalid.
It can be said that conditions satisfying the crite­
rion of logical significance will preclude the necessity of 
the introduction of the principle of validity, in that such 
arguments as will have been reconstructed according to the 
principle of logical significance will be valid. This is 
true, and on this account the principle of validity will be 
restricted in use to those occasions on which observations 
as to validity and fallacy are to be made about arguments 
as a whole. Though its use will be rare, this principle
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is included in this section in order to have all possi­
bilities covered.
The same holds for the fifth principle of analysis, 
which is soundness. That argument is sound the premisses of 
which are true and the conclusion valid. As the principle of 
validity presupposes logical significance for premisses, the 
principle of soundness presupposes not only validity for the 
argument but also empirical significance for the premisses.
It is thus a two-fold criterion, and must be applied in order 
to separate valid arguments the premisses of which are empiri­
cally significant from those whose premisses do not meet this 
prior condition. Validity is a function of logical, not 
empirical, significance; soundness is a function of both.
As a criterion, the use of the principle of soundness will be 
restricted to those few occasions on which a summary obser­
vation of this nature is in order. As with validity, the 
principle of soundness is also included in order to cover 
all possibilities.
Of more importance to this analysis is the sixth 
principle, which is consistency. It inheres in the relation­
ship of premisses to premisses, premisses to conclusions, 
and conclusions to conclusions. Two separate propositions 
may be taken as consistent with one another if they do not 
rest upon mutually exclusive premisses, and if they are in 
agreement as to fact, assumption, conclusion, or expected 
consequences.
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It can be argued that this principle is redundant in 
the sense that propositions satisfying the principle of 
empirical significance will be consistent as to fact, argu­
ments satisfying the principle of validity will be logically 
consistent, and that soundness must therefore of necessity 
be a criterion of consistency understood thus. It must be 
granted that factual and logical consistency would be 
properties of all arguments meeting these expectations.
Consistency is not proposed simply for taking 
measure of that for which other principles are adequate. It 
is offered instead to cover conditions which are beyond the 
limits of the principles of logical and empirical signifi­
cance, validity, and soundness. Whereas these apply to 
particular propositions and arguments, the principle of 
consistency will apply to the general point of view of the 
Carnegie Commission taken as a whole. In this connection 
it should be noted that unsupported and/or unstated assump­
tions, and value judgments, may be discovered to have 
played an important role in the stance of the Commission. 
Separate propositions resting on assumptions false as to 
fact may nonetheless be in agreement. They may rest upon 
beliefs, commitments, value Judgments, or unarticulated 
theories having no basis in fact, but which are nonetheless 
in full agreement. Consistency that is false as to fact.
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and inconsistency, may be traced to words and their use, 
even to unstated assumptions quite determinative in their 
impact.
Hence the principle of consistency does not pre­
suppose a stringent level of significance, nor even validity. 
It is possible that certain separate recommendations of the 
Commission may appear to be in agreement when in fact they 
are generalizations for which no valid formal argument can 
be inferred. To the degree that any faulty logic or faulty 
information is in agreement as to fact, assumption, or 
consequence, such consistency may be described as the bias 
of the policy statements of the Carnegie Commission, and as 
further evidence of any presuppositions that have so deter­
mined it.4
The seventh principle of analysis is that of domi­
nance . It is an expression of the relationship of assump­
tions having logical significance to those that do not, and 
of those having greater significance to those having lesser. 
Given the option of alternative assumptions-as-premisses, 
dominance is a characteristic of that assumption which must 
be accorded significance either to the exclusion or subor­
dination of other assumptions as to principle or as to fact.
^As in quantitative research bias is understood to 
be a characteristic of a sample not corresponding in its 
distribution to the population from which it is drawn, it 
is similarly understood in this context to mean opinion 
purporting fact or principle, or assumptions as to fact which 
cannot be so taken.
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Dominance may be a characteristic of that which is uncertain 
or even false as to fact so long as it is a logical ante­
cedent to the Commission's point of view. It is through 
such logically antecedent assumptions that the conceptual 
basis for the Commission's point of view will be traced 
and any bias identified.
Special attention should be called to the fact that 
of all these analytical principles, the most crucial is that 
of meaning. This is for two reasons. First, statements 
purporting fact or principle cannot be accorded significance 
of any sort, nor can they be labelled as verifiable in prin­
ciple, unless they are clear as to fact and meaning. Clar­
ity and specificity are the preconditions of argument, and 
of any judgements about significance, validity, or soundness.
Second, the same principles of significance, 
validity, and soundness are not to be taken as presupposing 
a preponderance of formal or informal argument. It can be 
anticipated that the Commission's point of view may fre­
quently constitute no more than its collective opinion, and 
its recommendations a restatement of that opinion. Meaning­
ful statements about argument cannot be made if there is no 
discernible argument. Hence it will fall primarily upon the 
principle of meaning to construct the Carnegie Commission's
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point of view, and upon the principles of consistency and 
dominance to make final judgments.
It should be finally noted that either the Commission 
has followed a set of coherent principles specifically 
designed to bring factual information, its point of view, 
and its proposals into sound relation, or else unstated 
assumptions will have provided for any consistency inherent 
in the policy statements. It is this very possibility of 
assumptions and presuppositions functioning as antecedent 
conditions, that can serve to make the impact of the 
Carnegie Commission something more, something less, or 
something different than that which the Commission may have 
expected or intended. This may be taken as the hypothetical 
formulation which this study is intended to test.
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Design for this Study
The design for this study is suggested by the basic 
characteristic of the principle of meaning, which is the 
relationship of means to ends. As words are means to 
expression, so is the statement of propositions. It 
likewise holds that more detailed conceptualizations are to 
some purpose, and this is no less so for the Carnegie Com­
mission policy statements than any other documents.
However, the means-end relationship will now be 
taken as it applies to the functions of higher education, 
its supportive functions, and its implied and express pur­
poses as supplied by the Commission, as the basic construct 
of an analytical model. Basic to a given function is a 
means-end dyad standing as an indivisible analytical unit,
as for example resource use or governance functions as
means to instruction (see Illustration I, p. 38). Given 
certain purposes, as for example those of the Commission, 
serving as prior cause for intended effect, a series of 
events are then perceived to exist in sequence toward those 
ends.
The research model is initially built upon three 
such hypothetical functions, as follows:
Function A serving as a means to function B;
Function B serving as a means to function C.
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Hence,
A is related to B as means to end;
B is related to C as means to end.
In relation to function A in this sequence, function B 
serves as end, or in more theoretical language as goal, 
purpose, or objective. In relation to function C it 
serves as a means, which is to say that at the same time 
that B functions as an end to A it is a means to C. 
Consequently function C is the ultimate end for both A and
B, while B, as the purpose of A, may be described as a 
penultimate end for the reason that it is also a means to
C. These three functions, operating interdependently, 
shall be called a triadic sequence of cause and effect.
It should be noted, however, that it is not always 
necessary so to conceive a problem. If for example 
function C in our hypothetical sequence is neither desired 
nor expected, it may be dropped. Function B may in turn 
be perceived as cause for nothing except its own 
continuation. Hence it becomes the ultimate purpose of 
function A, with which it forms a dyadic series of cause 
and effect complete within itself. Function B is 
penultimate as to purpose given the triadic sequence, but 
ultimate given the independent dyadic sequence.
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These two separate hypothetical sequences may be 
illustrated as follows:
1. The dyadic sequence reads,
A as the means to Bnv
with the arrow indicating that B is cause for A. 
B is ultimate as to purpose.
The triadic sequence reads,
•   < ■
A as the means to B, as the means to C, 
with the arrow indicating that C, as the predetermined 
end, is prior cause for both A and B. C is ultimate 
and B penultimate as to purpose.
The same two elements can be combined into a more general 
construct in order to represent contradistinction, comple­
mentarity, mutually exclusive alternatives, or contradiction, 
as follows:
Function C as prior cause for both functions B and A
i /A
t
as means to as means to
V
B as cause for A
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A word is in order about the function of goals, 
objectives, or especially purposes, as the latter is the 
term preferred by the Commission. Given certain purposes 
as the motivations for preferring certain means to the 
desired end, an ends oriented pattern of action is thus 
set into operation. Such may be described as being teleo- 
logical and cyclical. A given end, so long as it is 
the ultimate end and remains unchanged, functions as prior 
cause to perpetuate the set of conditions described by it. 
Hence function C may be perceived as prior cause for function 
A in the triadic sequence, function B for function A in the 
dyadic sequence, with the perceived end in each case closing 
the cycle of functions or events.
This model can be illustrated by substituting for
the hypothetical functions means and ends that actually 
exist, as follows:
Function A as learning in the predicative sense;
Function B as learning in the substantive sense.
Learning in the predicative sense has reference to learning 
as a process —  research, scholarship, and creativity as
processes. These are the means to the end in which learning
as an accomplished fact is realized, which in turn represents 
learning in the substantive sense —  the possession of skill 
and knowledge. Accordingly the functions of learning can be 
understood as ends in themselves. When this is observed to
36
be the case, then the cause and effect sequence is of the 
form,
Predicative learning as a means to substantive learning,
with the dyadic sequence of events operating independent of 
other ends. That is to say that means and ends are deter­
mined within the system of action so defined, and to the 
extent that this takes place the function set can be 
described as operating autonomously.
In the triadic sequence, learning is not essentially 
an end in itself, but a means to other ends, and is there­
fore subject to those other ends in their function as prior 
cause. Though functions A and B shall also be taken here 
as representing learning in the predicative and substantive 
sense, function C is now added to represent learning in the 
utilitarian sense —  knowledge and skills as judged accord­
ing to their social usefulness. The dyadic sequence is 
thus incorporated into the triadic sequence as a subset, 
with social utility appropriating to itself control of the 
activity through its prior cause functions. Autonomy for 
institutions of higher education to generate from within 
their own ends and means can no longer be guaranteed unless, 
of course, social usefulness is understood to derive from 
learning as an autonomous function.
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Social control and autonomy as contradistinct but 
coexistent possibilities for prior cause may be portrayed 
as follows:





As means to ends i s  means
SOCIAL
ENDS
Autonomy as prior cause
This model will be expanded to apply to resource 
and governance functions as antecedent conditions related to 
one another and to the learning process itself, functions 
upon which the learning process is in fact contingent. They 
may also be perceived as owing their existence as functions 
to the learning process, aside from which there would be no 
reason for them. This duality of possibilities, analogous 
on the one hand to social control and on the other to 
autonomy, represents the basic framework within which the 
analysis shall proceed. The model is expanded to include 
these additional maintenance functions in Illustration I 
on page 38.
AN ANALYSIS OF HIGHER EDUCATION FUNCTIONS
IN THEIR CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONS
Social control; externally determined purposes as prior cause for 



















As means to CO00
Autonomy: knowledge as independent 
cause for functions of learning 
and their maintenance
ILLUSTRATION I
The lines and arrows above the cells in this illustration indicate 
that socially determined ends are logically significant antecedents exer­
cising prior cause for the learning enterprise and its support functions of 
resources and governance. The Arrows below the graph indicate autonomy for 
the functions of learning, or learning as an end in itself.
CHAPTER IV
THE ANALYSIS OF PURPOSES AND PRIORITIES
With a theoretical construct of means-end relations 
as a frame of reference, the analysis now proceeds to the 
Carnegie Commission's formal statements of purposes and 
priorities for the future of American higher education. The 
immediate object will be to identify prior cause functions, 
separate ultimate from penultimate ends, and further pursue 
the problem of meaning according to the ends to which terms 
and concepts are used (Illustration II, p. 40).
The Commission originally set forth its statement 
of proposed purposes for higher education with the publi­
cation of The Purposes and Performance of Higher Education 
in the United States; Approaching the Year 2000, in June, 
1973.1 A second list offered as representing the same 
purposes, though at some variance with the original,
appeared in Priorities for Action; Final Report of the
2Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. The final form, 
as the Commission's last word, will be taken as authoritative
^(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company), p. 1.
^(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), p. 26.
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AN ANALYSIS OF HIGHER EDUCATION FUNCTIONS
IN THEIR CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONS
Social control: externally determined purposes as prior cause for 
the learning enterprise and its maintenance functions.
m m
Autonomy: knowledge as independent 




Chapters Four and Five analyze the purposes and priorities of the 
Carnegie Commission in order to determine the assumptions as to purpose and 
whether they presuppose social control for higher education, autonomy for 
the learning enterprise, or both.
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The First Purpose
The first of the purposes offered by the Commission 
suggests, both the dyadic form in which learning may be an 
end in itself, and the triadic form in which it serves ends 
beyond itself. It is as follows: "Advancing the intellec­
tual and professional capacity of students within a con­
structive campus environment." Clarity as to means is 
contingent upon that which is meant by a "constructive 
campus environment;" clarity as to ends by the "advancement 
of intellectual and professional capacity of students.
As to the development of intellectual capacity, this may 
mean no more than an expression in personal terms of the 
principle that learning is an end in itself. But as to the 
development of professional capacity, this cannot be so 
reduced because of the implied use of learning as a means 
to occupational objectives outside formal education. Be it 
law or medicine, engineering or business, the purpose of 
education thus perceived suggests utilitarian values. The 
principle of learning as an end in itself becomes penul­
timate, the cycle of cause and effect triadic, of the form: 
Learning (function A) as a means to skill (function B) 
as a means to a profession (function C ) .
OCarnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Priorities for Action:
Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1Ô7S), p. 2ë.
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In either the case of intellectual or professional 
development, it is not inconsistent with this purpose to 
assert that the ultimate purposes of education may consist 
of the goals brought to the enterprise by the student as 
client. Insofar as those goals of the student seeking 
intellectual development are consistent with the principle 
of learning as an end in itself, that principle may hold. 
Otherwise, from the point of view of the client, it does not 
hold. In its earlier statement of this purpose the Commis­
sion referred to the "development of students," and to 
"their more general developmental g r o w t h . "4 Though it is 
quite general in its formulation, this highly individualis­
tic reference is stated in a manner according to which 
client purposes may indeed become the ultimate end to which 
higher education is put.
Second Purpose
Contrary to the highly individualistic reference of 
the first purpose, the second states practically the same 
end in social, or collective, terms: "Enhancing human capa­
bility in society at large through training, research, and
4Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The Purposes and Performance 
of Higher Education in the United States: Approaching the 
Year 20ÔF5' (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), p. 1.
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service.*'® With reference to means, the Commission has 
moved from the general in the case of the first purpose to 
the specific in the case of the second. "Training, research, 
and service" have taken the place of a "constructive campus 
environment." Considered separately, and according to their 
common usage, these terms may be understood in their gramma­
tical relationship to "human capability in society at large" 
to denote means to ends on the following order:
research as a means to the creation of knowledge,
training as a means to the transmission of knowledge,
and service as a means to the application of knowledge. 
These become, in a sense, partial descriptors of the "con­
structive campus environment."
At the same time it is true that the first and 
second purposes advanced by the Commission are redundant. 
Taken together, they express the same general proposition 
that, individually and collectively, the functions of higher 
education are to serve both individuals and society as a 
whole in their general intellectual, skill, and professional 
development. Because the two incorporate the same general 
proposition they represent only one recommended purpose.
This purpose retains in principle the alternative of
®Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Priorities for Action: Final 
Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (New 
York: Mc-Graw-Hill Book Company, 19Ÿ3), p. 26.
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Interpreting learning, as an end in itself, as being either 
ultimate or penultimate. Research and training are consist­
ent with both options, but the concept of service is clearly 
utilitarian.
Third Purpose
In the third statement of purpose, learning in the 
predicative sense as a means to learning in the substantive 
sense, along with any utilitarian functions of learning, 
as learning, are missing. That purpose is as follows: 
"Increasing social justice through greater equality of 
opportunity to obtain an advanced education."® Attention 
has moved from the means and ends of education to a concern 
for the abstract condition of equal opportunity to obtain 
an education. As such it is not a criterion of education 
but of social justice, rather than a function standing in 
cause-effect relation to the means and ends of learning.
In its earlier statement of this purpose the Commis­
sion referred to "the enlargement of educational justice for
7the postsecondary age group," which is an expression imply­
ing more than an abstract condition of opportunity. However, 
the Commission further explained this point at the time by
G Ibid.
^Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Purposes and Performance of 
Higher Education in the United States: Approaching the Year 
2000 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), p. If.
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defining it as primarily providing opportunity. It was 
nonetheless indicated that more places would have to be 
provided in order to include those for whom equal educa­
tional opportunity would heretofore have been denied.
Higher education thus became a means to ends of the larger 
society. This assumption as to principle indicating 
utilitarian ends is of some consequence, as will be seen 
when subjected to an analysis of meaning in the next 
chapter.
Fourth Purpose
The fourth of the Commission's purposes clearly 
indicates both the dyadic sequence with self-contained 
ultimate purpose, and the triadic sequence with utili­
tarian purpose for education, as follows: "Advancing
learning for its own sake through science, scholarship, and 
the creative arts, and for the sake of public interest and
consumption."8
By setting forth science, scholarship, and the 
creative arts as means to learning —  as an end in itself —  
the Commission has clearly appropriated this assumption as 
to principle into its purposes. This likewise requires the 
condition in which operational independence for learning,
^Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Priorities for Action: Final 
Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), p. 26.
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or autonomy, is logically necessary. If it is to exist for 
itself the ends of learning must inform the means, and 
restrictions of any sort serve to substitute whatever ends 
might inhere in those restrictions. Though this argument is 
not used by the Carnegie Commission, it necessarily follows 
from the principle of learning as its own end, and aside 
from which that principle has no meaning.
But learning, taken not only as an end in itself, is 
proposed in this same purpose "for the sake of public 
interest and consumption."9 In this case learning is penul­
timate as to ends, and as a function serves a public demand. 
This leaves the fourth purpose as a whole incorporating 
separate ends that are in effect disjunctive unless one is 
subordinated to the other. Learning as an end in itself and 
utilitarian learning represent separate principles, both of 
which are here assumed by the Commission as determinative 
for the future of higher education. These separate 
assumptions as to principle are indeed matters to be consi­
dered further in the analysis of meaning.
Fifth Purpose
The fifth and final purpose offered by the Commis­
sion for the future of higher education appears on first
reading to be a clear statement of the utilitarian, triadic 
9Ibid.
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sequence, as follows: "Evaluating society, for the benefit
of its self-renewal, through individual scholarship and 
p e r s u a s i o n . "10 stated in the format of the means-end 
sequence the statement takes the form: Individual scholar­
ship and persuasion (function A) as means to knowledge 
(function B ) , are taken together with knowledge as means 
for evaluating society (function C) for the benefit of its 
self-renewal. If in fact evaluation and self-renewal are to 
serve as prior cause for scholarship and persuasion, then it 
follows that society must subscribe to the critical function 
of higher education as an unassailable value. This in turn 
implies independence, a condition which cannot be present 
unless the learning functions are permitted to operate 
autonomously, both as to the selection of commitments and 
the pursuit of knowledge.
As this must be the case, then learning as its own 
end becomes prior cause for society to maintain this func­
tion set. Society is to reorder itself according to the 
weight of scholarly persuasion. This represents an 
inversion of the cause-effect, independent-dependent 





The Commission makes what appears to be a substan­
tial distinction between purposes and priorities. "Purposes 
are the overall ends of higher education. Priorities relate 
to those things that most need to be improved, both as to 
means and as to ends."ll Priorities thus become, in the 
Commission's point of view, a characteristic of the order of 
importance given the means and ends of education at a point 
in time. The circumstances of priority can be attributed to 
a number of variables as for example resource availability, 
program inadequacies, and public interest in the improvement 
of some aspect of higher education.
However, this distinction made between purposes and 
priorities does not consistently hold in the actual usage of 
these terms. It has already been noted in the previous 
section that the stated purposes prescribe means as well as 
ends. Likewise the priorities set forth by the Commission 
are formulated in such a manner that they introduce different 
ends than those which have been previously offered. Those 
priorities are as follows (with those ends which may be 
taken as introducing new purposes in addition to those which 




"Preservation and enhancement of quality and diversity 
"Advancement of social justice 
"Enhancement of constructive change 
"Achievement of more effective governance
1 9"Assurance of resources and their more effective use"
In the case of social justice there is an identity of 
purpose and priority. This can logically be taken as a case 
of giving precedence to this purpose over other possible 
purposes not included in this list. Consequently there is 
no ambiguity as to the relationship of purpose to priority 
in this instance.
This is not so simple a matter with the other prior­
ities in this list. Consider for example the first prior­
ity —  the clarification of purposes. It was in this 
connection that the Commission restated the five purposes 
set forth in a previous monograph, as has been noted in the 
analysis of those same five purposes above. It should now 
be noted that these purposes have been offered by the 
Commission as though the act of doing so were sufficient in 
order to initiate the process of clarification. Further 
criteria, in the form of proposals involving people other 
than members of the Carnegie Commission in a continuing 
process, are not really offered. The Commission has chosen
12 Ibid., p. 23.
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instead to assert that it believes its own list of purposes
to be adequate for higher education taken as a collective
enterprise. Then one reads, on the Commission's orders,
that "higher education needs to clarify what it thinks it is
about and to place this clarified set of purpose (sic)
1 ?before the nation." In strict grammatical terms, the 
antecedent of "this clarified set of purposes" is not clear, 
even in the total context from which the quote is taken. It 
could either be the Commission's purposes or self-determined 
purposes. As a consequence of this ambiguity the reader can 
only conclude that the Commission's expressed goals, and its 
admonition, simply represent its opinion on the matter. 
Neither is the Commission's opinion clear. There is no 
inherent assumption as to principle other than those which 
have already been expressed in the statements of purpose.
It has been demonstrated that the second and fourth 
priorities set forth as ends quality, diversity and construc­
tive change, though it will later be illustrated that diver­
sity and constructive change are sub-categories of quality. 
These ends do not appear with the stated purposes, though 
they are extensively discussed throughout the policy state­
ments in connection with them. This is particularly true 
of quality of education and equality of educational oppor­




its more specific descriptors of the means of learning —  
training, research, service, science, scholarship, and the 
creative arts —  are discussed not only as means to purposes 
but also to priorities. This definitely leaves the Commis­
sion's separation of purposes and priorities uncertain.
The two remaining priorities set forth by the 
Commission, more effective governance, and the assurance and 
more effective use of resources, are not presented in such a 
way as to make their relationship to the means and ends of 
learning clear. Governance in particular is treated in such 
a manner that it takes on the character of a miscellany, 
with a great deal of attention given to some of the problems 
which the Commission takes as belonging to governance -—  
collective bargaining, politicalization (sic), and political 
activism. The discussion of the effective use of resources 
deals with the cost of education as a maximum feasible per­
centage of the gross national product, or meeting the 
demands of greater enrollment without appreciable increases 
in the cost of education, of imposing certain demands upon 
instructional programs in order to reduce the amount of time 
that is spent in school, all of which will be treated in 
subsequent analysis.
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Summary of Chapter Four
In summary, it can be noted that there are a number 
of key terms and assumptions as to principle having logical 
significance for the Carnegie Commission's formal statements 
of purposes and priorities. The meanings of certain terms 
are antecedent to the meanings of certain principles, which 
in turn are antecedent to the general meanings of the 
purposes and priorities. Certain of these assumptions are 
implied, which is to say that they inhere in the purposes 
and priorities as they are stated. Certain of these are 
explicit.
The first such implicit assumption inheres in those 
statements of purpose presupposing a relationship of higher 
education to the supporting society. The possibility, 
indeed the necessity, of social ends acting as prior cause 
in the determination of program illustrates the logical 
significance of this relationship. For the purposes of 
this analysis that relationship will be referred to as the 
principle of social control. It need not be taken as 
deliberate or even conscious control, but it is nonetheless 
control in the sense that it is exercised by forces of the 
larger society acting upon the enterprise of higher educa­
tion.
The second such implicit assumption as to principle 
inheres in the relation of learning to its own ends, a
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relationship presupposing learning as an end in itself.
This same principle also presupposes independence, or 
autonomy. It may, or may not, be related to social ends, 
but insofar as it is valued by the supporting society it 
may control certain events in that society according to 
higher education’s research findings and its teaching.
The third assumption as to principle is that of 
equality of opportunity, or in certain references equality 
of educational opportunity. Because it has been explicitly 
appropriated into both the list of purposes and priorities, 
it represents a value judgment by the Commission. As such 
it is not to be taken as a bad mark. However, it only has 
logical significance for higher education, which is to say 
that it exercises in principle a prior cause function, 
in the sense that such education may be perceived and em­
ployed as an agent of equal opportunity, and as equal 
opportunity is a required practice of institutions of 
higher education. This principle, as a principle, is not 
intrinsically a part of the learning process, either as to 
means or ends —  not as it has been developed by the 
Commission. This is a matter of important consequence in 
the interaction of this with the next of the principles, a 
point which will come to light in the next chapter.
The fourth assumption as to principle is quality.
By its nature it is the expression of the relationship of 
performance to expectations, though it is never so defined
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by the Commission. It should be recalled that quality was 
not set forth as a purpose of the Commission, but as a 
priority. But if quality as a maintenance function is to 
be of any consequence, then it must in some sense be 
perceived as an operational objective. We have already 
seen in this connection that a superficial separation of 
purposes from priorities has resulted in ambiguity.
This introduces the problem of meaning as it applies 
to these assumptions. The problem involves not only the 
substantive meaning of such terms as "purposes" and "priori­
ties," but also "equality" and "quality." Moreover, there 
are assumptions as to meaning related to all of the above 
principles. This holds for the relationship of higher 
education to the supporting society, the very nature of 
learning, and assumptions about the order of dominance —  
according to which one principle will prevail over the other 
when the two are in conflict. The next chapter will 
continue the analysis of the assumptions as to principle 
as they apply to "equality" and "quality."
CHAPTER V
THE ANALYSIS OF THE MEANING OF QUALITY AND EQUALITY
Quality and equality, as principles antecedent in 
meaning to certain of the purposes and priorities presented 
by the Carnegie Commission in its final report, were a 
concern of this group from the outset. It should be re­
called that Quality and Equality was the title of the very 
first policy statement.^ Even at the time the formation of 
the Commission was announced in February, 1967, reference 
was made to the "quality of education"^ as one of the 
issues that this group would consider. Throughout this 
period both the equality of educational opportunity and the 
quality of educational functions have been treated as 
though these have been as pressing as any two issues facing 
higher education today. The next step of this analysis is
^Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality; New 
Levels of Federal Responsibility"?or Higher Education (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968).
^"Clark Kerr Heads Study of U. S. Higher Education," 




to establish the empirical reference or meaning of each of 
these terms.
Equality of Opportunity
The argument for the equality of educational oppor­
tunity is based first upon the nation's democratic tradi­
tion, and the role that education has played in that tradi­
tion. This is seen as becoming more important to society 
as it in turn becomes more complex, and more demanding of
3institutions of higher education for trained personnel.
The argument is based secondly upon the belief that 
Americans aspire to extend universal education beyond high 
school into the college years. A Gallup Poll is cited indi­
cating that ninety seven percent of all parents questioned 
desire that their children enter college/* The Commission 
argues first, that "More and more Americans, with aspi­
rations for a better life, assume the necessity of a college 
education," and second, that "Equality of opportunity 
through education, including higher education, is beginning 
to appear as a realistic goal for the less privileged of our 
society."5 At the time this was written (1968), a college
3Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality; New 
Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education (New 
York: McGraw-riill Book Company, 1966), p. 1.
* Ibid., p. 7.
5Ibid., p. 1.
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education had been perceived by the Commission as taking on 
the connotation of necessity. Moreover it is not just the 
opportunity to obtain such an education that constitutes 
social justice, as was implied in the final purposes and 
priorities set forth by the Commission, but in the earlier 
reference the education itself —  it is through the acqui­
sition of it that equality of opportunity in the larger 
society can be achieved.^
Thus an important assumption is made by the Commis­
sion in its use of the principle of equality of opportunity; 
The objectives of higher education necessarily become those 
of the student clientele, which are, according to the 
Commission, fundamentally social and economic. As the 
social ends of the clientele, they become the ultimate ends 
of higher education.
The argument for equality of opportunity is based 
thirdly upon the proposition that it is not fully in effect. 
One can hardly question the empirical significance of this 
proposition, a point which the Commission makes by thor­
oughly reporting the circumstances according to which such 
equality is denied. Five categories are offered: income, 
geographic location, ethnic group, age, and quality of 
early schooling. The point is made that families in the 
higher income levels are many times as likely to send their 
children to college as those from the lowest levels.
®Ibid.
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Minority groups are under-represented, as are people from
certain geographic areas. Many Americans who are beyond
that which is traditionally thought of as college age did
not have the opportunity to continue their education at
this level, and it is believed that some of these would
7benefit in doing so. The meaning of equality of educa­
tional opportunity is thus further defined by those economic 
and social conditions under which it cannot truly exist.
Though the Commission did not carry its discussion 
further in order to demonstrate the points of conjunction 
for the categories of disadvantage, it does treat them as 
though they largely occur together, and particularly accord­
ing to geographic region. Special remedial programs are 
proposed for elementary and secondary school age children in 
Appalachia, the Ozarks, and the inner city, in an effort to 
treat some of the effects of disadvantage prior to comple­
tion of secondary school. It is also recommended that 
college recruitment programs concentrate upon these same
areas in order to further increase per capita attendance
8among the disadvantaged groups.
One set of recommendations does not follow the pre­
mise that disadvantage occurs according to region, but
7 The Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher 
Education, Report of the Commission, A Chance to Learn;
An Action Agenda for Equal Opportunityin Higher Education 
(New York; McGraw-bill Book Company, 1970), pp. 1-3. '
8 Ibid., pp. 6-9.
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instead is based strictly upon the demonstration of finan­
cial need. First and most important of these were the 
proposals for economic opportunity grants, as follows:
The Commission recommends strengthening and expanding 
the present program of educational opportunity grants 
based on need by providing:
1. That the level of funding be increased so that 
all college students with demonstrated need will be 
assured of some financial aid to meet expenses at 
institutions which they select
2. That grants based on need be available for a 
period not to exceed four years of undergraduate 
study and two years of study toward a graduate 
degree.9
In addition to this the Commission has recommended federal 
and state matching grants, federally supported institutional 
scholarship funds, and that which has since become known as 
the work-study program. The Commission acknowledges that 
not all these are new programs, though the level of funding 
proposed in the year 1968, and again in 1970, if adopted, 
would have substantially increased the funding.^®
Still another recommendation was designed to initi­
ate aggressive searches for graduate student talent, and to 
provide research to assist high school counselling programs 
in the early identification of those students possessing
^Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality: New 
Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education (New 
York: McGraw-rilll Book Company, 1960), p. 19.
l®Ibid.. p. 22f.
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sufficient talent to attend c o l l e g e . T h e  position taken 
is not one of passive support for potentially i^good students, 
but active exploration of the population in order to find 
them, wherever they are, and further assure them that what­
ever the social or economic circumstances of inequality 
might be, equal educational opportunity will not be denied 
them.
Also toward the achievement of the goal of equal 
educational opportunity the Commission recommends the conti­
nued expansion of community colleges until eventually there 
is one within commuting distance of ninety-five percent of 
the nation's population. The original recommendation was 
for an additional 230-280 such institutions.^^ A two-year 
program is regarded as an essential characteristic of insti­
tutions designed to offer both academic transfer and 
terminal occupational programs to all students. Conversion 
to institutions offering four-year baccalaureate programs 
is considered as inconsistent with the comprehensive purpose 
of these institutions. But full transfer rights to four- 
year colleges for those who successfully complete a two-year 
college preparation program are urged.^
lllbid., p. 24f.
l^Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The Open-Door Colleges ; 
Policies for Community Colleges (New York: McGraw-HillBook 
Company, 1970), p. 39.
13 Ibid., pp. 16-19.
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The Commission further argues that all comprehensive 
two-year colleges should practice an open admissions 
policy, charge little or no tuition, and offer to all 
students extensive services in educational and occupational 
g u i d a n c e . 14 These institutions would in effect serve as the 
basic institutional type through which equality of oppor­
tunity would ultimately be extended to all the population. 
Such colleges thus would be the primary agents of the policy 
of "universal access" which, on account of location, low 
tuition, occupational program options, and counselling 
services, they are perceived as being ideally equipped to 
be.15
In summary, it should be first noted that equality 
of opportunity is taken as being deeply rooted, in principle 
if not in fact, in the American democratic tradition.
Second, equality of educational opportunity is taken as 
demanded by all segments of the population, including those 
to whom this has generally been denied. Third, it is used 
in such a manner that it has reference to social and 
economic opportunity as its functional purposes. It is 
therefore utilitarian with this set of purposes exercising
l^ibid., p. 22.
15carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The Capitol and the Campus ; 
State Responsibility for Postsecondary Education (New York; 
Mcùraw-hill Book Company, lôVl), p. 51.
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prior cause function. The means to correcting situations of 
disadvantage are remedial programs in the public schools, 
massive programs of grants and loans as well as remedial and 
research programs in institutions of higher education, 
aggressive recruitment programs, and expansion of the 
nation's system of universal access two-year colleges.
Quality and Equality as Interacting Principles
The Commission’s fundamental assumption as to the
measure of quality appears in the following statement; "Our
*
colleges and universities must maintain and strengthen
academic quality if our intellectual resources are to prove
16equal to the challenges of contemporary society." Hence 
quality, as a descriptor of academics, becomes a function of 
the expectations of the supporting society. Those expec­
tations have been set forth by the Commission as follows:
The economy is dependent upon basic research and advanc­
ing technology, and upon the higher skills needed to 
make that technology effective, to assure national 
economic growth and well-being.
More managers, teachers, and professionals of all sorts 
are required to serve our complex society. More health 
personnel are essential to staff the fastest-growing 
segment of our national endeavor.
^®Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality: New 
Levels of Federal Responsibility'^or Higher Education (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 1.
l?Ibid.
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It can be seen that certain presuppositions have 
been incorporated into those expectations —  continued 
economic growth with its attendant increased requirements 
for technological, administrative, and pedagogical or 
professorial skills. Standards of skill required by these 
occupations and socio-technological functions logically 
become the conditions of quality. Education would thus 
have quality to the degree that it meets the standards of 
skill, knowledge, and other aspects of formal preparation 
that are implicit in the expectations put upon it by the 
supporting society. Though this assertion does not appear 
specifically, it is the logical antecedent to quality given 
the arguments that the Commission has advanced. The 
possibility of this can be illustrated by reference to that 
condition which Niblett has described as the "natural 
tension"^® between equality of opportunity and academic 
excellence. The Commission first avoids this issue by 
making an assumption; and second, by offering a formula. As 
to the assumption, it is taken for granted that American 
higher education is of such quality that it enjoys a 
reputation of pre-eminence the world over.^® That quality
l®8ee supra p. 14f and ff. Roy Niblett, "The Commis­
sion’s Work: A View from Abroad," Change, November, 1973, 
p. 39.
IBcarnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The More Effective Use of 
Resources : An Imperative for Higher Education (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 1. ~
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should nonetheless be maintained, extended, and, in certain 
cases, improved.
As to the formula, the position is taken that equal­
ity of educational opportunity, yet to be fully realized in 
the United States, must forthwith be assured without any 
reduction in the quality of instructional, research, or 
service functions of higher education. In support of this 
concern certain adjective phrases are employed which, by 
virtue of their repetition, evolve into cliches. One such 
phrase is "quality of result and equality of a c c e s s . "^0 The 
second is a refinement of the same theme that better marks 
the disjunctive nature of the two concepts, and may be 
paraphrased as the endorsement of the principle of universal 
access to higher education but the rejection of the notion 
of universal attendance. This is taken by the Commission 
as setting forth the conditions on which equality of access 
will be provided and quality of result maintained.
The argument is advanced that many will not want to
go on to college, will not be able to benefit from it, and
because of family or societal pressures may become reluctant
attenders. On this account the position is taken that:
we therefore oppose universal attendance as a goal of 
American higher education and believe that non-college 
alternatives should be made more available and more 
attractive to young people.
20Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality; New 
Levels of Federal Responsibility~7or Higher Education (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 1.
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We favor, on the other hand, universal access 
for those who want to enter institutions of higher 
education, are able to make reasonable progress after 
enrollment, and can benefit from attendance.
Universal access and universal attendance are thus offered 
as being complementary to one another, and to quality and 
equality. Universal access represents a restatement of the 
principle of equality of opportunity according to socio­
economic conditions which must be fully compensated for if 
equality of education opportunity is to be realized. But it 
is so understood to proscribe a particular universe, includ­
ing those who either have or are potentially able to demon­
strate the ability to perform according to the standards of 
higher education, and exclude those who cannot.
It follows that these terms reflect two judgments. 
The first, universal access, has reference to socioeconomic 
conditions that must not determine the course of one's 
education. The second, universal attendance, so delimits 
the principle of equality of opportunity that conditions of 
inequality other than socioeconomic may determine who may, 
and who may not, remain in school at the college level.
This is the logically antecedent condition upon which the 
principle of universal attendance is rejected. The practi­
cal consequence is that after the initial matriculation, 
and allowing for the operation of certain compensatory
21Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, A Chance to Learn; An Action 
A genda for Equal Opportunity in k igher Education ('New York; 
McGraw-Èill. B ùok Company ; l^iVo), p. il.
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programs, discrimination can be expected to take place on 
the basis of ability and performance.
As the principal institution through which equality 
of educational opportunity is to be extended, the community 
college logically becomes the agency through which discrim­
ination on the basis of ability and performance is most
22likely to take place. It is its mission to maintain
policies of low tuition and universal access, while other
institutions of higher education are only advised to take
exception to their selective admissions policies in order
to accommodate the socioeconomically disadvantaged. Their
basic obligation to the two-year college transfer student,
so it is recommended, is to admit those who have success-
23fully completed their program and are fully qualified.
The same community college likewise becomes the 
principal institution for the maintenance of quality, 
insofar as quality is a measure of student performance, for 
it is here that the student will find his educational pro­
gram coming to an end unless he meets the standards of 
quality required by the upper division institution to which 
he seeks transfer. Hence, the practical effect of the 
Commission's recommended policies would be to extend public
^Bgee supra, p. 61.
BScarnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, A Chance to Learn: An Action 
Agenda for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1Ô70), pp. 11-19.
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education as presently conceived in the United States by a 
maximum of two years. This logical consequence —  which is 
not so perceived by the Commission —  can be supported by 
two additional assumptions that the Commission makes.
Though they will be further discussed in other connections, 
it is appropriate to call attention to them in this context. 
The first has to do with the overlapping characteristics of 
the last year of high school and the lower division of
college, a point of view with important historical ante-
24cedents. The second has to do with the expressed desir­
ability of a pattern of governance that assures local
25control. These factors, together with little or no
tuition and a parallel program of occupational training, 
create a situation of similarity to that of the public high 
school more than higher education in its traditional sense.
The tension between equality of opportunity and 
quality of result has been alleviated by taking the position 
that these principles are to be enforced at separate points 
in time. Universal access, as an expression of the
24There are various references to how Henry Philip 
Tappan, William Rainey Harper, and others were in general 
agreement not only as to the nature of what we know as the 
lower division, but its similarity to secondary education.
A thorough account of this point of view may be found in 
Leonard V. Koos, The Junior College, Vol. II (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota ï^ress, 1921) , pp. 342-345.
ORCarnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The Open Door Colleges: 
Policies for Community Colleges (New York: McGraw-HillBook 
Company, 1970), p. 4Ô.
6 8
principle of equality of educational opportunity, has been 
put forward as an admissions policy, but with quality 
criteria taking effect at some later time. However, the 
Commission is quite vague about the latter, as shall be 
demonstrated in the next section.
Further Analysis as to the Meaning of Quality
Reference to quality is frequently made throughout 
the entire series of policy reports. It is viewed as being 
affected not only be the principle of equality of educa­
tional opportunity but also the use of resources. It is in 
this last connection that it appears most frequently. It is 
a fundamental criterion as to whether resources are being 
effectively used, even though the term is never defined with 
any precision.
This confusion as to meaning can be illustrated by
reference to a few passages wherein the context most closely
supplies a definition. The first such reference discusses
quality measures with output, leaving the reader to separate
out that which is applicable to quality, as follows;
When a college or university launches a move toward more 
effective use of its resources, no step is more impor­
tant than a careful analysis of costs, in relation not 
only to appropriate measures of input, such as FTE 
enrollment, but also in relation to appropriate measures
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of output or quality, such as credit hours completed, 
degrees awarded, performances of graduates on the Grad­
uate Record Examination, and ratings of its departments 
in the studies of graduate education that have been 
conducted by the American Council on Education and other 
agencies
According to this reference quality becomes a function of 
performance on standardized tests, ratings by government 
agencies, and other agencies. This point has important 
implications for the standardization of institutions, 
programs, and even courses, a trend that the Commission 
ardently decries in other references.2?
The Commission also believes that student-faculty 
ratios are an indication of quality, that it is a responsi­
bility of faculty to call attention to the importance of 
this criterion on those occasions that the management of 
resources may adversely affect it. At the same time the 
Commission reports that these ratios were pushed consider­
ably upward during the last decade with no apparent adverse
28effect on quality, and that in the interest of more
' Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The More Effective Use of 
Resources; An Imperative for Higher Education (New York; 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 44.
2?Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Reform on Campus; Changing 
Students, Changing Academic Programs (New York; McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1972), p. 35.
28Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The More Effective Use of 
Resources; An Imperative for Higher Education (Hew York; 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1Ô72), p. 64.
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effective use of resources this practice ought to continue
29but in a cautious manner. Curiously enough, the Commis­
sion does not report how one might know that quality was 
not affected by the ratio increase. That the ratio did 
increase is a simple matter of fact which can be taken on 
the strength of the reported statistics. However, the 
casual observation that there apparently was no concom­
itant loss in quality does not follow. This is particularly 
to be noted in light of the Commission's claim that "we know 
far too little about the impact of student-faculty ratios on 
quality of instruction."^®
Such an observation can only be made by one whose 
reference to any defensible quality criteria is either 
obscured, confused, or nonexistent. The following reference
further illustrates the Commission's confusion as to the
meaning and operation of the principle of quality:
Quality is of the essence in academic life and it is 
hard to measure; but among carefully selected institu­
tions and within the same institution it may be assumed 
to be sufficiently equal so that comparisons can be 
m a d e —  it is easier to compare quality than to measure
it.31
To argue that it is easier to compare quality than to 
measure it is to confuse the fact that measurement is a form
SSfbid., p. 23.
3 ® Ibid., p. 17.
Slfbid., p. 23.
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of comparison. It is either the comparison of at least one 
variable to another, or the comparison of one or more 
variables to a standardized scale, just as a carpenter 
measures dimensions with a rule, a psychometrist an indi­
vidual performance to national norms. The essence of 
measurement is comparison. This fundamental meaning 
escapes the Commission, as do the criteria for determining 
"carefully selected institutions" in order to make compar­
isons. Such preselected standards would in effect incor­
porate the social or institutional program expectations 
which that being measured —  or compared —  would be 
expected to meet.
For the principle of quality to have any meaning 
except in the abstract, it must have clear reference either 
to expectations or assumption as to expectations. It 
should be repeated that the one identifiable assumption 
happens to be that quality which is a function of social 
expectations. There are no clear references to self- 
determined program expectations. Specific performance 
criteria are also absent. Neither is there any discussion 
as to how such criteria ought to be determined. Prior 
cause therefore begins and ends with social expectations.
It follows that social control is dominant in this respect 
over other possible causal alternatives, and for this 
reason is the logically significant antecedent event to 
learning functions.
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Summary of Chapter Five
Social expectation is the underlying assumption of 
both equality of educational opportunity and quality of 
educational function. The two are advanced as complementary 
insofar as equality of opportunity is cause for either open 
or flexible admissions policies, depending upon the institu­
tion, and for both pre-admission and post-admission programs 
of compensatory education, and quality as a discriminatory 
maintenance function based upon ability and performance. 
Operating in conjunction the two principles would, assuming 
full adoption of the Commission recommendations, have the 
effect of extending universal education by a maximum of two 
more years, depending upon the degree to which those stu­
dents eligible for benefits under these provisions should 
use them.
At this point the similarity of the two principles 
breaks down. Equality of educational opportunity is a 
clearly defined concept, referring to the nation's demo­
cratic, egalitarian traditions, socioeconomic situations 
according to which those conditions do not in fact exist.
The term is consistently used in this reference. It has 
both empirical significance as to fact and logical signi­
ficance for the Carnegie Commission's point of view in that 
the empirical reference as to conditions of inequality, 
with the principle of equality, are prior cause for
73
commitment of resources and institutional efforts to these 
ends.
The same does not hold for the principle of quality. 
Its one discernible property is social expectation as a 
criterion source. Any other criteria which might apply to 
the functions of learning are vague or ambiguous, as for 
example the presumed difference between measurement and 
comparison which does not hold in fact. To the contrary 
there is an uncritical endorsement of the use of standard­
ized tests, as for example the Graduate Record Examination, 
as a measure of the quality of departmental or institu­
tional output. Such a practice implicitly subjects a 
given institution to norms which represent the expectations 
of a larger system, albeit an association or corporation, 
if not actually a federal agency. This vagueness as to 
meaning has important implications, as a consequence of 
which it will receive further attention in subsequent 
sections of this analysis. This will especially be the 
case in the discussion of the effective use of resources 
for higher education.
CHAPTER VI
THE ANALYSIS OF THE INTERRELATION OF ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT
QUALITY, EQUALITY, AND THE USE OF RESOURCES
Though equality of educational opportunity and qual­
ity of function are principles presupposing social expecta­
tions as prior cause, it does not follow that they function 
either as joint or parallel events in a means-end sequence. 
One would expect that they would determine resource alloca­
tion given the full adoption of the Carnegie Commission 
recommendations. This does not hold, for the two principles 
are in fact quite dissimilar in their relation to the 
allocation and use of resources. The relationships of these 
assumptions to resource use are the subject of this chapter 
(see Illustration III, p. 75).
The Implications of Equality of Educational 
Opportunity for Resource Use
We have seen that the Commission has argued that 
equality of opportunity, as a democratic principle, has yet 
to be fully realized in our society, that equality of 
educational opportunity is a means thereto, and that the
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ILLUSTRATION III
Chapter Six analyzes the assumptions as to purpose as they apply to 
resource use, and in order to determine if assumptions presupposing social 
control for higher education are dominant over assumptions to the contrary.
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long term trend from elitist, to mass, to universal access
education beyond high school should become a matter of 
1public policy.
A sense of the potential impact of this principle
can be gained by considering the range of recommended
activities for which federal support is proposed, and its
estimated cost. The student aid programs alone include
educational opportunity grants, work-study subsidization,
counselling programs, a graduate talent search program,
doctoral fellowships, and a student loan program. As was
noted earlier, these concepts are not original with the
Commission, but its level of funding proposed for these
programs is noteworthy. Expressed in constant value dollars
for the year 1968, nearly five billion would be allocated
for the year 1980. Additional recommendations for cost-of-
education supplements to institutions, construction,
research and other programs necessary to the implementation
of these recommendations would bring the total cost by the
2year 1980 to twelve billion, six-hundred-million dollars.
^Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, New Students and New Places; 
Policies for the Future Growth and* Development of American 
Higher Education (New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), 
p. 9.
2Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality:
Revised Recommendations (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1970), p. do.
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Hence the assumption of equality of educational 
opportunity as an end for educational function, and thus 
prior cause for those functions, would not exist exclusively 
in the abstract. It would operationally affect institutions 
of higher education. This point is further strengthened by 
the fact that certain of the proposals by the Commission 
presuppose that certain federal support funds, educational 
opportunity grants in particular, be matched by institu-
3tional funds. Such funds are necessarily enlisted in the 
support of purposes which may have merit, are taken by the 
Carnegie Commission to have merit, and may be so taken by 
institutions of higher education. That such ends represent 
socially determined education functions is a matter of logic 
entirely aside from this or any other value judgment about 
the matter. The object of this step in the analysis is to 
point out that massive federal resource allocation on the 
primary grounds of equality of opportunity in American 
society through education supplies the national system of 
higher education with this predetermined purpose. To the 
extent that institutions of higher education subscribe to 
these same ends, their institutional goals are in this 
respect utilitarian. This is a fact of argument according 
full logical significance to the principle of equality of
q̂Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality; New 
Levels of Federal Responsibility for fligher Education (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 19.
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educational opportunity, and thus to social ends, as this 
applies to the allocation of public tax revenue resources 
to these ends.
The Macroeconomic Assumption and its 
Implications for Quality
The macroeconomic assumption made by the Carnegie 
Commission is that the total expenditures for higher educa­
tion in the United States from all sources sjhould not appre­
ciably exceed a fixed percentage of the gross national prod­
uct. The Commission argues that:
the total expenditures of higher education must be, 
should be, and can be reduced by nearly $10 billion per 
year (in 1970 dollars) by 1980 as compared with the 
costs which would be incurred if the trends of the 1960s 
were to be continued; that expenditures should be held 
to a level around $41.5 billion as against $51 billion 
per year. This is approximately a 20-percent reduction. 
This would mean that these expenditures would rise to 
2.7-percent of the GNP as compared with their present 
percentage of 2.5 and as compared with the possibility 
of 3.3 percent if the trends of the 1960s were to be 
continued and as against about 1.0 percent in the year 
1960. We seek to show why this reduction of about 20 
percent needs to take place and how it can be accom­
plished without any general deterioration in the quality 
of higher education.* (Emphasis added.)
The macroeconomic assumption, with its implications as to
the nature and behavior of the principle of quality, is one
of major import, the Commission’s discussion of which will
now be treated.
^Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The More Effective Use of 
Resources: An Imperative for Higher Education (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 1.
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Standing at one percent in the year 1960, the pro­
portion of the gross national product allocated to higher 
education had experienced a phenomenal increase by the year 
1972, bringing the proportion of the whole to two and one- 
half percent. This rise has been both possible and neces­
sary. It has been possible on account of demand, on account 
of a generally rising level of personal income throughout 
our society, and because the public was willing to pay the 
price, to spend a substantial proportion of their increase 
in personal income for this purpose. This same increase was 
necessary because higher education has not experienced a 
productivity increase in the cost of education as compared 
to the industries in which rising productivity has been a 
continuing characteristic.®
According to the Commission, this trend cannot, and 
will not, continue unchecked. Not only must the total costs 
of higher education not be allowed to appreciably exceed two 
and one-half percent of the gross national product, neither 
must the annual increase in educational costs, allowing only 
for a negative productivity factor, exceed the annual rate 
of inflation.® This may be true. However, the Commission's 
arguments do not convey a sense of economic authority on 
this matter. They have reference in part to values,
®Ibid., p. 6f.
G Ibid., p. 7.
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attitudes, and opinions which either are known, or presumed, 
to have widespread following in society at large and inhere 
in psychological antecedents rather than the logic of 
macroeconomic theory.
The Commission argues for example that "middle class 
elements are . . . resisting the public subsidy of college 
attendance by children of lower income (including minority) 
families," and that "The 'adversary culture' may continue to 
find its most favorable environment on campus, and its 
greatest opposition in the general public."? The problem 
with these arguments is not with their basis in fact. There 
is no reason to reject them on this score alone. To the 
contrary, it is the Commission's use of them, for this is 
inconsistent with the proposal to spend billions of dollars 
in order to extend equality of opportunity to the very 
groups that have been denied this. The Commission has made 
certain proposals, if not bold in originality as least so in 
the call for an extensive resource commitment, and now 
proposes retrenchment. True, the retrenchment is not in the 
area of aid to students and institutions by the Federal 
government for the purpose of equality of educational 
opportunity, but for expenditures in connection with certain 
other aspects of academic programs. They are proposed 
nonetheless because middle class elements do not want to
?Ibid.
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subsidize the education of lower income groups. The Commis­
sion's recommendations are designed to respond to the 
expectations of both the needy and the affluent, but in the 
case of the affluent, the design is to mollify them with 
economies that will not eventuate in the objectives of the 
affluent.
The Commission also argues that other "great prior-
Oities remain before the nation." Granted that many such 
priorities do exist, as they surely do, the crucial issue 
for higher education is where it may stand in the order of 
these priorities. Of equal importance is the merit of 
instructional programs and what those programs must cost if 
they are to be adequately maintained. The Commission did 
indeed use costs as a means of determination of its recom­
mendations for programs of equal opportunity. But now it 
changes principle for making other recommendations on the 
basis that popular support can be questioned rather than 
on the basis of the estimated cost of quality requirements.
Yet the reader is told that costs can be so reduced 
without any adverse effect on quality. One can infer, on 
the basis that societal expectation is the one constant 
reference of the concept of quality according to the Commis­
sion's usage of this term, that changing expectations will 
satisfy this condition. If the public should prove to be
®Ibid.
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satisfied with that which is twenty percent cheaper, then 
quality will have been maintained.
This brief caricature is not offered as the inevi­
table consequence of the Commission's point of view, though 
it may be the consequence. To the contrary it is advanced 
in the absence of any specific quality criteria, of any 
principles for determining such criteria, in order to 
illustrate one possible consequence resulting from the use 
of a term having neither parsimony or specificity as to 
meaning. It follows that in the absence of any variables 
that have been identified for measurement or "comparison," 
or any agreed upon standards for doing so, the argument as 
to quality can only rest upon popular judgments. Social 
expectation and quality may both vary, but so long as the 
latter appears to be the equal of the former, the quality 
criterion could be satisfied. In light of this it could be 
claimed that the Commission's insistence that quality can 
be maintained on expenditures that should be reduced by the 
year 1980 to a figure twenty percent below the present 
trend would amount to a self-fulfilling prophecy.
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The Assumption that the Knowledge Represented by the 
Standard Bachelor's Degree Is a Constant 
and Need Not Be Changed
The reader is not left without recommendations for 
reducing total costs for higher education while at the same 
time presuming to maintain quality. These recommendations 
are made with full appreciation of the demands that will be 
put upon higher education in the coming years. Likewise the 
Commission takes full account of the impact of its recom­
mendations for equal educcational opportunity should they be 
adopted, and also those for a vastly expanded program of 
health care education. It estimates that these and other 
growth factors will create a need for another three million 
student places by the year 1980. This represents a fifty 
percent increase over the year 1972, when the policy state­
ment in question was written.® In light of these expec­
tations on the one hand, and a twenty percent projected 
reduction in expenditures on the other, it must be said 
that any measures proposed for the reduction of costs would 
have to be extensive in their impact. In this respect they 
are impressive, as will be shortly demonstrated.
But of more interest to this analysis is the fact 
that certain of these recommendations introduce the reader
9 Ibid., p. 7.
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to assumptions about the nature of learning, and of know­
ledge. They also further illustrate the consequences of 
that which takes place on account of the assumptions that 
have been made about the nature of quality. The recommen­
dations call for a significant reduction of the amount of 
time that students spend in college, for the further 
adoption of non-traditional degree programs, and for the 
greater use of certified non-traditional educational 
experience to meet the requirements of regular academic 
degree programs.
One recommendation is based on the reasonable 
assumption that there will be increasing differences as to 
ability, level of acquired knowledge, and interest of stu­
dents as programs designed to further the cause of equality 
of educational opportunity are put into effect. This 
recommendation is offered as a "foundation year . . . 
tailored to a more rapid, less rapid, or customary progress, 
to a degree depending on the past training and ability of 
the individual student."10 This recommendation is defended 
on the grounds that:
If a college were to structure the first-year course 
work for each student according to his own preparation, 
maturation, work schedule, and educational objectives,
lOcarnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The Open-Door Colleges: 
Policies for Community Colleges (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1970), p. 26.
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with the help of precollege examinations and individual 
faculty advisors, then no group —  as a group —  would 
be identified as special or disadvantaged.il
Whereas the foundation year would give the disadvantaged an 
opportunity for compensatory training, the undecided an 
opportunity to explore the various professional and educa­
tional options open to them, it would permit those who have 
accelerated their learning to move on to advanced course 
work. This could hold also for students who have experi­
enced some form of non-traditional learning beyond the 
secondary school.
A specific recommendation of the Commission follows 
upon this very possibility: ’’That the time to get a degree 
be shortened by one year to the B. A. and by one to two 
more years to the Ph. D. or M. D. p r a c t i c e . T h i s  pro­
posal is further supported by the arguments that (1) the 
practice of granting advanced standing is widespread and 
could be increased to include as many as 500,000 students 
annually, (2) that substantial numbers of students have 
covered the entire first year of college work in high school,
llcarnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, A Chance to Learn: An Action 
Agenda for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company), p. 13f.
1 9Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Less Time, More Options: 
Education Beyond the High School (New York: McGraw-HillBook 
Company, 1071), p. IS.
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and for them much of the lower division course work is 
redundant, and (3) that students having educational defi­
ciencies upon entrance can take advantage of summer terms in 
order to complete an undergraduate degree program in three 
years. "Thus the lower division in college could soon 
become a one-year program except for those needing remedial 
work.
This point represents a substantial argument for the 
reduction of costs in that the amount of time spent in 
college by a given student could in principle be decreased 
by one academic year, even though the costs per year would 
remain the same. Increased enrollments in summer sessions 
would also mean better utilization of physical facilities 
and faculty.
There appear to be only two bases on which to take 
issue with the Commission's proposal for an accelerated pro­
gram of this nature. They both have to do with the unstated 
assumptions that have been made about the nature of learning 
and knowledge. These assumptions bear examination, a task 
which can best be accomplished by using theoretical quanti­
ties to represent the standard pattern of twelve years of 
elementary school and four years of college. The former 
twelve years shall be represented by the quantity X, and 
the latter four by the quantity Y. The total acquired
13%bid., p. 16.
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education for the holder of the standard baccalaureate 
degree or its equivalent may be stated as follows:
The B. A. = X + Y = 12 years + 4 years of education.
If a given student successfully completes high school with 
the total knowledge equivalent of one who formerly had gone 
on to complete the first year of college, that training 
could be expressed as:
High School Diploma = X + 1 = 13 years 
compared to the knowledge equivalent of prior standards. If 
this same person were to matriculate at a college or univer­
sity and receive full credit for this extra attainment, the 
work remaining in order to qualify for the degree could be 
expressed as:
The B. A. = (X + 1) + (Y - 1) = 13 year equivalency +
3 years.
The standard baccalaureate degree is therefore taken to be 
a constant value. The knowledge that it is supposed to have 
represented in the past is likewise sufficient for the 
future.
This might be viewed as a factitive proof by those 
who would contend that the assumption is actually created by 
the theoretical formulation just advanced with this end in 
view. Anyone who would do so should consider two points: 
first, the consequences of the Commission's assumptions; and 
second, the alternative to this interpretation which, 
interestingly enough, the Commission has not advanced.
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Consider first the consequences. The proposals 
place proportionately more of the responsibility for the 
total education of the student upon the high school, and 
proportionately less upon the college. Secondary schools 
are in fact encouraged by the Commission to ’’take over the 
work now given in the first year of college," that colleges 
should look "to the time when the standard term of a B. A. 
degree will be three y e a r s . These developments would 
in effect reduce the two-year community college system to 
a one-year system for large numbers of students —  for as 
many as would have completed the secondary education in 
schools that cover the first year of college work in their 
last year.
Consider also these additional consequences of 
another recommendation —  that 230 to 280 new community 
colleges be constructed in the United States by the year 
1980. This represents by far the largest single expansion 
by type of institution recommended by the Commission. This 
will mean proportionately more students in two-year —  if 
not indeed in one-year —  institutions, proportionately 
fewer in four-year colleges and universities. This will 
also mean proportionately more in institutions with strong 
compensatory programs. Transfers will be more commonplace, 
the transferability of credit more important, with the 
prospect of the lowest common denominator the accepted norm.
l^Ibid., p. 27.
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Institutions of higher education will have the attention of 
students for twenty-five percent less time. Students will 
be devoting twenty-five percent less of their lives to this 
period of instruction. It is difficult to believe that the 
total acquired knowledge possessed by the student as a 
theoretical quantity, could be increased under these circum­
stances.
Consider briefly the alternative to this inter­
pretation —  that the level of knowledge which the bacca­
laureate degree represents not be held constant but permit­
ted to increase. This certainly appears to be a live option 
given that which the Commission claims is frequently happen­
ing —  that many students are indeed completing high school 
with a knowledge equivalent of those formerly completing the 
first year of college. It also would appear more desirable
given the Commission's own argument for the need of the
higher skills needed to manage our increasingly techno­
logical society.15
The Commission has instead taken the norms of the 
last decade as the standard for the immediate future. Those 
same norms can also be accepted, though the Commission has
not really stated this, as the criteria for quality. Their
l^Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality; New 
Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 1.
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adequacy has nonetheless clearly been assumed, and on the 
basis of this assumption the recommendations have been made.
Consider finally the basic assumption about learning 
that is implicit in the Commission's argument that the 
amount of time required for earning the bachelor's degree 
be reduced by one year. It should be recalled that this is 
based on the belief that there is much duplication between 
the last year of high school and the first year of college, 
that this duplication is wasteful of resources, of the 
student's time, and should therefore be avoided. It follows 
that one exposure to information, allowing for certain 
contrary strategies within a given course of instruction, 
ought ordinarily to be sufficient. However knowledge is 
gained it should be formally validated through testing, and 
when it becomes equal in kind to that required for a degree, 
then a degree should be awarded.
So much is assumed, and the information so scant, 
that no conclusions about learning theory can be drawn from 
these references.16 Learning functions in higher education 
do appear to be mechanistic, with learning a matter basic­
ally of exposure to information or its presentation. Even
1 6Even though the Commission discusses these matters 
at length in another context, no clear understanding of 
learning theory or learning problems is exhibited. The 
impressions gained here apply there also. See The Fourth 
Revolution; Instructional Technology in Higher Education 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976), which will be 
treated at a later point in this analysis.
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though these bare outlines may be consistent with certain 
behavioristic theories, they are more noteworthy for that 
which is not stated than that which is; specifically, that 
whatever the nature of knowledge and learning, it can meet 
the quality expectations presupposed by the Commission's 
recommendations.
To be sure, these are matters quite aside from the
Carnegie Commission's basic concerns. They are of another
order than those pertaining to the nature of the learning
situation. The principal reasons advanced for reducing the
amount of time spent in obtaining a college education are
economic, as for example:
to assist students —  by saving the time of students by 
reducing the years they spend in education, by reducing 
the duplication between high school and college they 
now endure^?
As has been pointed out, "the cost will be the same for each 
year but there will be fewer years to pay for and one less 
year of foregone earnings."18
The above statement resounds with mathematical 
certainty, but only because the economic imperative to save 
resources forced other assumptions. Quality is assumed, as 
has that which can be accomplished within the learning
17 Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The More Effective Use of 
Resources: An Imperative for Higher Education (McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1972), p. l5.
1 ftIbid., p. 16.
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process, but without a systematic consideration of what is 
involved in either case. The economic presupposition has 
dictated the form that the recommendations have taken, and 
with which other variables must fit.
Summary of Chapter Six
This analysis has demonstrated that insofar as 
resource use is concerned, the principle of equality of 
opportunity has logical significance. It truly functions as 
a variable within the means-end sequence of events as prior 
cause for the allocation of resources according to the needs 
of those who by virtue of deprivation have been denied equal 
opportunity. This principle represents a specific social 
expectation, the empirical significance of which has already 
been accorded as either verified or verifiable in principle. 
Clear as to meaning, consistent as to use, the order of 
dominance can be traced through it to social control as 
prior cause for the functions of higher education.
This cannot be said for the principle of quality. 
Though it was labelled in the previous chapter as being 
logically significant in principle, this was taken to be so 
only with reference to social expectations as a criterion 
set. This does not hold in connection with the Commission's 
treatment of resource use. It might have reference to 
social expectations; it does have reference to contemporary 
norms in higher education according to certain contexts.
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Lacking in meaning, it has no empirical significance, no 
logical significance, nor is it consistently used with 
reference to the same assumptions. The term meets none of 
the criterion principles of this study.
More importantly, quality as a term means that 
which is left for it to mean after the economic imperatives 
have been satisfied. It is left with contradictory refer­
ence as to meaning, indicating no empirically verified or 
verifiable criterion statements as to fact, and therefore 
has no causal, or logical, significance.
Vague and uncertain assumptions as to the nature of 
learning and knowledge have made their first appearance in 
this study. As with the meaning of quality, these concepts 
can only mean that which they must mean in order for the 
economic argument to hold. This in turn means that the 
theoretical quantity of knowledge representing the bache­
lor's degree is assumed to remain for now a constant, and 
that the dynamics of learning can adequately function 
within the economic restrictions imposed upon them by the 
Commission recommendations.
CHAPTER VII
THE ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIPS OF GOVERNANCE:
SOCIAL EXPECTATIONS AS THE 
GIVEN CONDITION
The antecedent assumptions about quality, equality, 
social control, and autonomy apply not only to the use of 
resources but also to governance (Illustration IV, p. 95). 
Any prior conditions which may determine how resources are 
to be used can be expected not only to influence these but 
also other decisions. For this is the essence of govern­
ance: the specific patterns of role interaction according 
to which decisions are made, conflicting expectations 
resolved, and all activities directed through which insti­
tutions take, and are given, their general direction as to 
programs and operational purposes.^
Ijohn J. Corson has offered a similar definition 
which lists by group the role incumbents, and which presup­
poses a measure of autonomy, features which this analysis 
will supply according to the general position of the Commis­
sion. Corson's definition is as follows : " . . .  the process 
of deciding. . . . the process or art with which scholars, 
students, teachers, administrators, and trustees associated 
together in a college or university establish and carry out 
the rules and regulations that minimize conflict, facilitate 
their collaboration, and preserve essential individual free­
dom." Taken from Governance of Colleges and Universities 
(New York : McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960), pp. 12-13.
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Chapter Seven analyzes the assumptions as to purpose as they apply 
to governance in order to further determine the dominance of socially 
determined ends over the functions of learning, and according to which it 
is discovered that the fundamental control is the market.
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This definition is constructed in such a manner that 
it is not to be taken as making any assumption about the 
roles involved, or as to whether groups external to institu­
tions of higher education have a role in governance. It is 
designed instead for use in the assessment of the relative 
power of social control and autonomy, in contexts other 
than quality and equality. These terms are used as defined 
not by the Commission but by the analytical model, as prior 
cause functions determining in principle the organizational 
behavior proceeding not from but through decisions and 
their execution. If one prior cause principle is clearly 
dominant over the other, or if behavior reflects an inter­
action of these principles, then it should so appear in this 
analysis.
A Preliminary Consideration of the Alternatives
The alternatives according to the analytical model 
may be described as three in number : social control, auto­
nomy, and a pattern of action in which these separate 
principles are perceived as interacting.
The first and second of these options are assumed 
to be of a theoretical nature, each functioning to the 
exclusion of the other. It should be recalled from Chapter 
Three that autonomy was defined as existing to the degree 
that prior cause for a given sequence of cause and effect
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2resides in that sequence. Prior cause taken thus is inter­
nal; which is to say that so long as the intentions and 
objectives of the learning enterprise belong to that enter­
prise by virtue of having been generated within it, the 
sequence of events may be described as autonomous. This 
condition exists so long as learning as an end in itself 
is prior cause for the means of learning —  so long as the 
learned and the ones learning follow the path of truth 
wherever it leads, so long as they are vested with the 
authority so to determine instruction and research, and so 
to act. But so long as prior cause is identified with 
external social forces operating déterminatively, control­
ling the sequence of events according to social ends, auto­
nomy is either subordinated or absent. Social control as 
prior cause and ultimate end, the condition according to 
which autonomy may not exist, then describes the state of 
affairs. Perceived as mutually exclusive functions, either
the learning enterprise or social control are prior cause
3for resource and governance functions.
The practical alternative presupposes complemen­
tarity and/or conflict through interaction. These two
2 Supra, p. 36
3
These latter functions are instrumental and contin­
gent, in that they exist for, and of, the learning enter­
prise, whether it be ultimate or penultimate as to purpose. 
Aside from their respective maintenance functions there 
would be no use for them.
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principles may operate simultaneously or at separate points 
in time depending on the issues and the customs, and as has 
previously been pointed out, society may defer to the learn­
ing function by allowing the enterprise of higher education 
a critical role vis-a-vis society. This represents a volun­
tary inversion of the principle of dominance, a condition 
which has been pointed out as being necessary if social 
criticism is to be a fundamental purpose of higher educa­
tion.
Finally, there may be assumptions and presupposi­
tions that predetermine how an agency of governance, be it a 
board, office of the president, or faculty is to perceive 
its role. These may support or contravene the recommen­
dations. These also are the final object of this chapter 
of the analysis.
The Commission's Point of View as to Recommendations 
for the Governance of Institutions 
of Higher Education
Chapter Four of this analysis demonstrated that the 
principle of autonomy —  as defined by the analytical 
model —  is implicit in certain of the Commission's
4expressed purposes. The analysis will now proceed to
4See supra, p. 45-47.
99
determine if this point of view holds in fact, and if so in 
what sense.
With respect to one of its early policy statements, 
this does not appear to be the case. In The Open-Door 
Colleges the Commission takes the position that the govern­
ance function is influenced by the relationship of separate 
levels of government, not only as these relationships apply 
to resource allocation but also to the determination of the 
types of instructional programs.® State and national 
manpower boards ought also to be factors in this collective 
governmental influence, though they are not so important as 
the local board because:
occupational programs need to be geared to local, state, 
and national labor market trends, and for this reason it 
is particularly desirable that they be guided by an ad­
visory board composed of persons thoroughly familiar 
with the local labor market.®
Hence the role of the board is to assess labor market condi­
tions, and introduce and support the types of programs 
offering training in the skills necessary to meeting the 
demands of the market. Moreover, the expectations to which 
a local board is expected to respond are predetermined —  
the expectations of a market upon the institution.
5 Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The Open-Door Colleges: 
Policies for Community Colleges (New York: McGraw-HillBook 
Company, l970), p. 47.
®Ibid.
1 0 0
The Commission does endorse autonomy, but in a very
problematical reference, as follows:
Not only is it important to provide for a meaningful 
degree of local autonomy, but the problem of building 
community support for local community colleges without 
impairing their autonomy is a difficult one.?
The term "autonomy" is used twice in this one statement,
but each time with a different grammatical antecedent. The 
first reference, to "local autonomy," is to local community 
control of such an institution by means of a locally 
selected lay board, thus meaning independent community con­
trol. The second reference to "autonomy" in this same sen­
tence does not mean community control of the institution, 
but instead some indeterminate measure of self-governance 
for these institutions. "Local autonomy" is viewed by the 
Commission as a constraint upon, if not actually a threat 
to, institutional autonomy. The two separate locii of
Qautonomy are thus viewed as being in tension.
If one retraces the steps of the Commission's argu­
ment it shall be observed that the principle of dominance is 
at work. Though the principle of faculty autonomy is 
upheld, the nature of it is not clear. To the contrary 
there is some specificity as to the expected membership of 
the board of control and the hierarchy of influences imping­




expertise in the management of instructional programs, or 
even for its understanding of the institutional life of 
community colleges. Instead it is to be selected on the 
basis of a potential imcumbent's familiarity with the local 
and regional job market. It is to be influenced by state 
and national manpower needs. These needs are in turn to 
determine the instructional programs. It is therefore not 
a local board, not an instructional staff, not an adminis­
tration, but output expectations originating in the larger 
society that ultimately control the institution. We have 
already noted that the Commission's descriptor for these 
expectations is —  the market. This market circumscribes 
the role of the board, the president, and the faculty, and 
likewise autonomy as a descriptor of instructional program 
determination.
In the seventeenth of its twenty-three policy state­
ments, Governance in Higher Education; Six Priority Prob­
lems,^ the Commission appears to be taking a different posi­
tion. Public control, as the authority vested in agencies 
of government, and institutional independence, denoting 
areas of authority reserved for boards of control and by 
consent of the same and by custom to presidents and facul­
ties, are viewed as existing jointly. Public control 
designates an area of circumscribed power, independence one
^(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), pp. 25-
27.
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of circumscribed freedom. The Commission’s recommendations 
as to the power of appointment to boards of control —  who 
may serve, their qualifications, and the pattern of repre­
sentation are carefully designed to provide constraints upon 
governors, budget officers of the state government, or any 
other person with vested interests.^® Governors should not 
serve on the boards of control for public institutions. The 
appointments they make should be ratified by legislatures; 
and alumni, faculty, and students, should be given some 
influence in the power of appointment. Board membership 
ought to reflect age, sex, and racial groups. Faculty 
members from other institutions should be considered for 
appointment to a given board, and faculty and students 
should be represented on committees of the board for their 
own institution. These recommendations accord the principle 
of institutional independence both logical and empirical 
significance. They are based upon the factuality of the 
situation and the principle is in turn a causal factor for 
these recommendations.
The same can be said for public control. Law 
enforcement is reserved for the courts, power of appointment 
to the board of control, either to the governor and legis­
lature on the one hand or the public domain through popular
l°Ibid., p. 35.
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election on the other. The state shall also appropriate 
funds and conduct postaudit.
As to the balance between independence and public
control, it shifts in favor of the latter on two counts;
determination of institutional function, and the effective
use of resources. These areas of authority are perceived
as functions of a state coordinating agency through program
approval for the former, budget review and postaudit for 
12the latter. It hardly need be argued that program appro­
val has clear implications as to influence over the means 
and ends of learning. In Chapter Six it was demonstrated 
that the same also holds for the effective use of resour­
ces, particularly as this concern has been perceived and 
interpreted by the Commission.
Social Expectation as the 
Given Condition
Beyond the seeming difference in the point of view 
of the Commission's treatment of governance in The Open- 
Door Colleges, and its later and more thorough treatment 
of this same subject in Governance of Higher Education, 
there is a degree of consistency.
^^Ibid., p. 26.
12Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The Capital and the Campus: 
State Responsibilities for Postsecondary Education (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), pp. 23-37.
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This consistency is partially obscured by the fact 
that even though the principle of autonomy had been consis­
tently upheld throughout the preparation of the policy 
statements to the one on governance, it was then dropped on 
the grounds that:
Autonomy, in the sense of full self-governance, does not 
now exist for American higher education, nor has it 
existed for a very long time —  if ever. Autonomy is 
limited by law, by the necessary influences and controls 
that go along with financial support, and by public 
policy in areas of substantial public concern. Autonomy 
in these areas is neither possible nor generally 
desirable.
It is argued to the contrary that institutional independence 
should be preserved, that ’’Higher education . . . should be 
substantially self-governing in its intellectual conduct, 
academic affairs, administrative arrangements.”^^ Autonomy 
as a term of reference is rejected; independence is chosen 
in its place, then circumscribed to mean partial indepen­
dence. This preference does not alter usage, which, in the 
policy statements, has been substantially synonymous. The 
Commission has reference to functions, areas of authority, 
and circumscribed areas of freedom.
It is in this sense also that the terminology of 
the Commission is at some variance with the analytical 
model. Whereas "public control" applies to the powers of
1 Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Governance of Higher Educa­
tion: Six Priority Problems (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1973), p. 17.
l^ibid., p. 18.
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appropriation, appointment of boards, ’’social control” 
applies not just to functions but to assumptions about the 
nature of events in their cause-effeet, means-ends rela­
tions. It applies to the given conditions to which govern­
ance activities must respond, and as those conditions are 
perceived to be characteristics of the larger society. 
’’Autonomy” similarly has reference to such given conditions 
as they are perceived to inhere in the relationship of the 
means and ends of learning as an independent function. As 
theoretical principles, social control and autonomy are 
once removed from the Commission’s express concerns and its 
preoccupation with deciding within whose purview a given 
activity happens to fall.
The Commission’s unexamined, fundamental, and 
determinative assumption in the interpretation of govern­
ance activities is the microeconomic demand of individuals 
for instructional services —  the market. The ability to 
interpret the market was the one prerequisite worthy of 
mention as to whom should serve on community college 
boards, a given condition expressed in the very same 
paragraph in which local and institutional autonomy were 
upheld. One cannot escape the paradoxical conclusion that 
a display of independence, of freedom, of that self-determi­
nation which is autonomy, is contingent upon response to the 
market.
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If to the contrary one is to understand independence 
as a condition of self-determination circimscribed by market 
forces, then the paradox can be avoided. The market and the 
principle of independence function at separate points in 
the sequence of events, with independence existing so long 
as market forces, as antecedent events, are satisfied.
It follows that autonomy, understood as a term denoting 
absolute and complete independence, should ultimately have 
been rejected by the Commission as an inaccurate descriptor. 
In similar fashion the principle of autonomy, as this 
theoretical concept is perceived by the analytical model, 
expresses a condition which the market, as a ruling princi­
ple, precludes. Predicative and substantive learning are 
subordinated functions.
Partial exception is taken to the market model on 
at least one occasion, but this supports rather than negates 
its use. This ironically takes place in a discussion of 
models for governance, in reference to which the Commis­
sion insists there are none. Yet from several options the 
market is taken as one having limited application.^® More 
importantly, the same policy statement takes a position 
fully consistent with the market model. This takes place 
in response to the question: "How . . . may independence
be earned?" Several answers are provided, the first of
l®Ibid., p. 14.
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which is, "Performing . . . functions that are important to 
the people in the larger society."^® This is virtually the 
academic equivalent of economic free enterprise in that 
market response is the condition of freedom.
Because it has not been theoretically formulated, 
the principle of the market cannot be taken as a model. It 
is instead a presupposition, and as such it repeatedly 
represents the basis on which decisions are made. In its 
actual use it may have a variety of applications —  the 
market for jobs or skills requiring collegiate training, 
for certain courses of instruction aside from their occu­
pational importance, and for contract research.
In The Capitol and the Campus the Commission asks 
whether or not the market should be a regulator. It is seen 
as the alternative to pervasive governmental control, while 
at the same time governmental support is seen as a facili­
tator of the market. Just as the colonies supported higher 
education for that which the Commission perceives as certain 
desired results, so did the national Congress inaugurate the 
Land Grant movement. Higher education has enjoyed state 
supported lotteries, exemption from taxes, and military 
service; and "In turn, the colleges fulfilled their public 
responsibilities by providing the type of educational
IGlbid., p. 24.
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17services which society seemed to need." Because the 
greatest support for higher education today comes from
public financing, the state is perceived as the "one big
18purchaser."
The failure of the professor to understand this 
fundamental reality is perceived as a problem. The asser­
tion is made, perhaps erroneously, that professors "do not 
directly subject their wares to a market test,"*® and are 
isolated from these pressures. Because they have tenure 
there is little if anything that can be done about their 
insensitivity to the market. This, however, is not so much 
a problem calling for correction as one that must be accep­
ted in the interests of faculty freedom, morale, and self- 
determination. It is nonetheless a problem for the presi­
dent of an institution, who is faced with:
an independent artisan economy from the point of view of 
producing services but it is a collective enterprise in 
terms of securing income —  and the chief artisans have 
tenure . . . .  [With] little or no control over the
1 7Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The Capitol and the Campus: 
State Responsibility for Postsecondary Education (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, l97l), p. 11.
^®Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The More Effective Use of 
Resources: An Imperative for Higher Education (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 197S), p . S 2 .
IGlbid., p. 21.
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component outputs or the totality to which they add 
up . . . the [president] must take the totality and 
present it for the highest price he can get.20
The professor’s independence is described as ”a productive
form of mild anarchy —  internal free enterprise. Note
again the use of economic figures of speech.
No sooner is this point made than the market is
viewed as a solution to the problem of effective use of
resources. The commission proposes that students "conduct
the search for lower cost, higher quality, and greater 
22diversity" through the expenditure of their money for 
tuition. As has been pointed out before in connection with 
recommendations for the effective use of resources, this 
can have consequences for instructional program. The 
market would become the measure of which courses and pro­
grams are important and which are not. It would necessar­
ily determine, to the degree that it is depended upon, the 
areas in which institutions of higher education may be 
able to exercise independence. In a sentence, the market 
becomes the dominant force in the management and operation 
of the enterprise of higher education.
20ibid., p. 22.
Bllbid.
22 Ibid., p. 23.
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Summary of Chapter Seven
Given social expectations in the form of a demand 
for the academic equivalent of goods and services as the 
condition to which the agents of governance must respond, 
public control and independence are then both terms with 
logical and empirical significance. As conceptualized, 
their reference is to fact; they are cause for the Commis­
s i o n ’s recommendations. It follows that higher education 
decision making proceeds from the interaction of roles 
according to which the principles of public control and 
independence are causal. They would determine the locus 
of responsibility for the various types of decisions that 
have to be made.
But public control and independence are once 
removed from the theoretical concepts of the terminology of 
the model. Social control and autonomy denote assumptions 
as to fact which are taken as prior cause for governance 
functions, whereas public control and independence have 
reference to the functions themselves. The functions of a 
state coordinating agency represent public control; social 
expectations social control.
Social expectations manifest themselves in the form 
of demand for specific courses, degree programs, and other 
services according to their occupational and social useful­
ness. The presupposition as to the role of the market thus
Ill
becomes the dominant given condition from which decisions 
proceed. There is no cause for governance activities to 
show a response to self-determined ends derived from the 
nature of learning-as-such so to function. The market is 
supreme.
Ch a p t e r  v i i i
THE FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, 
ITS EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS, AND RELATED 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ITS FUTURE
If the market is to determine the appropriation and 
allocation of resources, and in turn the decision making 
commonly described as governance, then it follows that the 
same may in principle cover the activities of learning.
This can be interpreted as restricting any possible autonomy 
for those functions which have been described as predicative 
and substantive learning. In the face of this prospect it 
is incumbent upon the student of the policy statements to 
look for evidence to the contrary. The analysis therefore 
turns to a consideration of the possible conditions under 
which the principle of learning as an end in itself, which 
the analytical model refers to as autonomy, may be a domi­
nant feature in higher education (Illustration V, p. 113).
This principle concerns not only the nature of 
learning as such, in and of itself, but also the nature of 
the relationship of this activity to the total society aside 
from support and governance functions. It should be
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AN ANALYSIS OF HIGHER EDUCATION FUNCTIONS
IN THEIR CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONS
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Chapter Eight analyzes the nature, scope, and functional relatin- 
ships of learning in order to determine if these can be understood inde­
pendent of the social expectations which the Commission has consistently 
assumed to be the fundamental controlling mechanism for the functions of 
learning.
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recalled that the operation of this principle was implicit 
in the fourth of the formal purposes expressed by the 
Commission. It should also be recalled that the critical 
function, expressed in the fifth purpose, requires an 
inversion of the principle of social control in order to 
assure the independence of higher education to perform a 
critical function.^ The analysis now proceeds to determine 
if these purposes can in any sense be taken as compatible 
with the Commission’s presuppositions and assumptions.
Higher Education’s External Relationships
It has been pointed out that in its relationship to 
the larger society higher education is to respond to the 
knowledge, skill, and research needs of a technological- 
industrial society; that as for the individual it is 
primarily a means to social and professional opportunity. 
Though the policy statements are vague as to that which is 
meant by quality, standards of excellence are usually to be 
taken to be that which is necessary for a society as 
understood by its technological and economic growth charac­
teristics .
Descriptors of that relationship according to 
characteristics that are not economic in their point of 
view are difficult to find. They are generally used in
^Supra, p. 47.
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passing, and the context is so limited that inferences 
according to such are not based upon sufficient data to be 
reliable. The Commission’s references to culture illus­
trate this point:
The cultural contributions of higher education take on 
wider dimensions as rising levels of education and grow­
ing affluence and leisure make possible greater concern 
with the quality of life in the United States.^
This proposition is offered with little evidence as to what
is meant by culture. In at least one other passage the term
has reference to the fine arts, particularly the performing
arts. One of the perceived benefits of a community college
for example is its possible value in the fostering of the
arts as a cultural contribution to its locale.^
Beginning with the tenth of the policy statements 
reference is made to the "cultural revolution," which repre­
sents the first appearance of this term in a context with 
shades of meaning congruent to its anthropological usage.
In this connection the observation is made that;
More young people are now seeking vocations or life­
styles outside the Horatio Alger syndrome than ever 
before. How far will this go? Higher education is
^Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality: New 
Levels of Federal Responsibility"for Higher Education (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 1.
qCarnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, New Students and New Places:
Policies for the Future Growth and Development of American 
Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), 
p. 3.
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built on the work ethic and we may now be shifting to 
a more sensate culture.4
This reference is far more revealing in its assumptions
about the past and present than its concern for the future.
Aside from whether it has any significance as to fact, this
statement clearly leaves the Commission attached to a point
of view. Though one cannot assume thereby that the "Horatio
Alger syndrome" has been equated to the work ethic, it is
without doubt perceived as coexistent and complementary to
the latter. Moreover the prospect that the Horatio Alger
model should go into eclipse throws into question the
compatibility of higher education premissed upon the work
ethic with whatever might follow.
Upward mobility —  if this represents in contempo­
rary language the nineteenth century success story given 
expression by Horatio Alger —  is consistent with the 
Commission’s assumption that one important purpose of 
American higher education is for individuals to utilize it 
in the pursuit of a "better" life. Neither is it inconsis­
tent with the assumption that the purpose of higher educa­
tion is to train managers, professionals, and technicians, 
and to provide expertise and research on a utilitarian basis.
^Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The Open-Door Colleges: 
Policies for Community Colleges (New Ÿork; McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1970), p. 17.
5Supra, p. 62.
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In a similar vein the recommendations for community
colleges include the strengthening of vocational training,
in-service training for skilled craftsmen, occupational
training for adults, and extensive programs of occupational
guidance and placement. The discussion culminates with a
statement that renders inference unnecessary in order to
sense the economic and utilitarian presuppositions:
It is particularly important for all students to recog­
nize that, whether they choose a transfer, general 
education, or occupational program, the ultimate objec­
tive is preparation for an occupation. . . . Thus a 
primary objective of guidance programs should be to 
encourage students to make wise choices between curri­
cula that are specifically designed to prepare them for 
an occupation and those that are designed to lead to 
ultimate career choices that benefit from prolonged 
academic education preceding specialization.®
The only surprising element in this statement is in its
presumption as to what the students' opinion should be.
As a generality to which certain exception can be taken,
this statement must surely have considerable empirical
significance. There is some well-informed opinion of long
standing to this effect.? Unfortunately this uncritical
value judgment of the Commission is taken as binding upon
all matriculants. Accordingly the prevailing norms for the
present are endorsed for the future, and current practices
and their premisses are left unexamined.
^Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The Open-Door Colleges: 
Policies for Community Colleges (New York: McGraw-HillBook 
Company, 107o), p. 21
7Thorstein Veblen, The Higher Learning in America 
(Stanford, California: Academic Reprints, 1954), pp. 85-134,
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Even so the Carnegie Commission is not without its 
idealism and social concern. It has expressed its support 
for the improvement of society through its instructional, 
research, and service functions. In Higher Education and 
the Nation's Health it has made recommendations designed 
to vastly expand the programs of training for physicians,
Qdentists, and medical support personnel. It has recom­
mended that higher education attack the problems of the 
environment, and foster research in learning theory and 
educational methodology.®
This idealism is ruled nonetheless by a conception 
of culture that is fundamentally economic. In summary, the 
findings following the analysis of resource and governance 
functions still hold —  that higher education will continue
to serve society essentially on society's own terms. Higher
education need not necessarily accept that society as good 
in every important way, but even the task of social improve­
ment would have to be as a response to expectations that 
pressing social npeds will be met.^®
Q
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970).
®Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Quality and Equality:
Revised Recommendations —  New Levels of Federal Responsi­
bility for Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, idtO), p. 26f.
^^Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Reform on Campus: Changing 
Students, Changing Academic Programs (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 19Ÿ2), p. 25.
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Nature and Scope of Higher Education
The analysis now moves to the center of the nature 
of higher education —  its scope and internal relationships. 
It will be demonstrated that aside from socioeconomic 
expectations, the Commission’s assumptions as to the nature 
of higher education are obscure. Meanings are not easy to 
infer. This in turn results in negative judgments about 
significance, validity, and consistency because these are 
criteria that apply to meanings. Selected passages will 
illustrate the problem of interpretation.
Scope
It is a natural practice of a reader to assume that 
word usage follows custom, or a standard reference defini­
tion unless it is stated otherwise. This practice does not 
always serve the reader well. A case in point is the type 
and range of institutions to which the Carnegie Commission 
is referring when it speaks either of higher education or 
postsecondary education. One can peruse several of the 
policy statements without meeting a serious problem on this 
score because the reference is usually to institutions 
offering programs leading to the bachelors’ degree or 
beyond. Occasional references are made to a concern for 
including other institutions in the discussion and planning 
for education beyond high school, but without conveying a
120
sense of meanings for the terminology contrary to familiar 
usage.
Then, in the eighth of the policy statements, the 
Commission took issue with that which it perceived as the 
popular meaning of the term "higher education" and its 
connotations.
As it is usually defined, higher education encompasses 
only public and private two-year and four-year colleges 
and universities. Defined in this way, higher education 
includes some 2,500 institutions and about 8 million 
students. Postsecondary education more broadly defined, 
however, also includes private profit and non-profit 
trade and technical schools, public adult and area 
vocational trade union apprenticeship as essential in 
state planning.il
If higher education is to have reference to all postsecond­
ary education, and if the popular notion of higher education 
is taken to be insufficient because it does not, then it 
follows that recommendations as to equality of opportunity, 
as to goals for postsecondary education, as to resource 
allocation, apply to all institutions embraced by this more 
inclusive conceptualization. In The Capitol and the Campus 
this is indeed the case. Furthermore, the placing of two 
years of postsecondary education "in the bank" for every 
high school graduate, as recommended in Less Time, More 
Options, is seen in retrospect so to apply.1^
11Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The Capitol and the Campus: 
State Responsibility for Postsecondary Education (New York; 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), p. 8.
12 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), p. 20.
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The Commission further calls for a "pluralistic
system of postsecondary education," which suggests
that state governments should broaden the focus on 
higher education that prevails today. Even in a state 
like New York, where the scope of authority of the 
Board of Regents is broadly defined in legislation, the 
Board’s activities in higher education have only 
recently begun to broaden beyond the chartering of 
institutions and registering of programs.
This redefinition of higher education, and consequent 
redirection of the authority and interest of state govern­
ment agencies responsible for higher education, results in 
the inclusion of 7,000 trade and technical schools and more 
than 500 apprenticeship programs including adult schools and 
even correspondence schools in the discussion.
By implication the goals of universal access, 
"economic equality of opportunity," and program diversity 
are in part accomplished by the extension of the redefini­
tion of higher education to include non-collegiate institu­
tions and programs of instruction. Though this does not 
appear to have been the intention of the Commission, it has 
the practical effect of bringing these and other recommen­
dations closer to realization. Certain recommendations 
would apply to the entire range of institutions and certain 
would not. The reader is left determining on the basis of
l^Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The Capitol and the Campus ; 
State Responsibility for Postsecondary Education (New York; 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), p. 8,
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the sense of a given recommendation the types of institu­
tions for which it would hold.
This results in a built-in uncertainty, though it 
should be acknowledged that the weight of the discussion 
is related to higher education according to its generally 
accepted meaning.
Then, in the twenty-first of twenty-two policy 
statements, the problem created by this confusion is final­
ly clarified. Postsecondary education is defined as "all 
education beyond high school." Higher education is re­
stricted to mean:
academic degrees or broad occupational certificates.
It takes place on college or university campuses or 
through campus substitute institutions, such as the 
"open university" with its "external degrees."
Further education denotes :
occupational skills rather than academic degrees.
It takes place in many non-campus environments —  
industry, trade unions, the military, proprietary 
vocational schools . . .14
In being definitions which are at variance with the
Commission’s own prior usage of "higher education" and
"post-secondary education", these do nothing to clarify
any ambiguity.in the first twenty policy statements.
l^carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The Learning Society: 
Alternative Channels to Life, Work, and Service (New York : 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), p. 3.
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The Degree and its Meaning
Just as the Commission has expressed some interest 
in postsecondary education aside from that which has tradi­
tionally been called higher education, and expects that some 
of its recommendations would apply to these concerns, it 
similarly takes a flexible position toward the type of work 
for which credit may be given toward the earning of a 
degree —  as for example advanced standing, CLEP, and 
military service. The Commission has recommended for 
example that "post-secondary educational opportunities be 
encouraged outside the formal college in apprenticeship 
programs, proprietary schools, in-service training in indus­
try, and in military programs." These same programs should 
receive governmental support with credit granted on the 
basis of appropriate mechanisms. It is also recommended 
that "employers . . . hire and promote on the basis of 
talent alone as well as on prior certification ............
That professions, wherever possible, create alternate routes 
of entry other than full-time college attendance . . ."15 
Tfken at face value these recommendations do not appear to 
be particularly startling.
l^carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Less Time, More Options; 
Education Beyond High School (New York : McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1Ô71'), p. l3f.
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This does not hold for the argument upon which they 
rest. That argument appears in a section so problematic 
that only a full reading of it can convey its impact. It is 
as follows:
[These recommendations) will require better tests of 
talent, more exercise of individual judgment by employ­
ers and their representatives, more training opportuni­
ties on the job, and more concern for ladders to rise 
and less with ceilings based on prior certification.
The best test is performance on the job. The Educa­
tional Testing Service (ETS) and the American College 
Testing Program (ACT) have had great experience with 
testing and might turn more of their attention to 
achievement testing as the basis for certificates that 
will take the place of degrees. Degrees might also be 
given as a result of these tests by ETS and ACT inde­
pendently or with a recognized college or university. 
But, essentially, employers should do more of their own 
screening for talent and rely less on the instrumental­
ities of the college, which are designed primarily for 
other purposes. Greater reliance by employers on tests 
developed to screen applicants for positions would be 
vastly less costly to society than using the B. A. 
degree to screen.
This passage endorses a de-emphasis on degrees and certi­
ficates representing satisfactory completion of educational 
programs by proposing "more concern for ladders to rise and 
less with ceiling based on prior certification. The best 
test is performance on the job." In the next sentence the
Commission proposes a type of assessment degree, which in
turn is followed by a proposal for "instrumentalities" less 
costly than a B. A. degree program. The statement is made
that college degree programs are for other purposes. This
paragraph, aside from its internal inconsistencies, appears
IGlbid., p. 14.
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to be strangely out of touch with the principle of equal 
educational opportunity, and the prevailing belief on the 
part of the Commission that education is essentially train­
ing for a job.
The Commission goes on to recommend a degree struc­
ture terminating every two years, with the Associate of Arts 
representing successful completion of the lower division, 
the Bachelors' Degree the upper division, and a Master of 
Philosophy awarded for the completion of two years' work 
following the undergraduate program. A Doctor of Arts is 
also recommended for more widespread a d o p t i o n . E x c e p t  
for the latter, there is very little argument as to why this 
structure would be an improvement. The claim is made that 
it would provide a stopping off point every two years 
instead of four, which, it should be noted, is a matter of 
convenience rather than the consequence of something inher­
ent in the educational process. The claim is also made that 
those who cannot and should not go on will be able to accept 
the Associate of Arts as a certificate of accomplishment 
rather than accept dropping out as a mark of failure.
The Master of Philosophy is offered as a teaching degree, 
and to serve occupations requiring more training than the 




the Doctor of Arts as a more widely disseminated degree, 
they will be treated in the next section.
The passage quoted above reflects the Commis­
sion's interpretation of the degree as a certificate of 
employment rather than representing the completion of a 
rigorous degree program. That the Commission does ques­
tion the appropriateness of degrees and certificates in 
this connection can be taken as grounds for a review of 
its own assumption on this matter. If the degree were to 
be taken as basically satisfactory completion of the pro­
gram it signifies, it would then be defined strictly on its 
own terms. The meaning of the degree would be a function 
of the relationship of mutually inherent means and ends.
The Certification and Evaluation of Teaching
One assumption of this analysis is that insofar 
as the ends of education inhere in the means, and those 
ends are the ends of learning in and of itself, the cri­
terion of autonomy has been satisfied. One would be mis­
taken to assume that the means and ends of learning 
represent a dichotomization of method and subject matter. 
Learning is instead a function of the exploring mind 
in which means and ends are a series of mutually stimu­
lating events, the consequence of which is knowledge
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19in the pursuit of more knowledge. This is not to the 
exclusion of the practical uses of knowledge, but neither is 
it subordinate to them.
If this theoretical concept exists in fact, one
would normally expect it to be where there is instruction.
In search of this the analysis turns now to the Commission's
conception of teaching, the preparation for it and its
evaluation. The Commission claims that for too long it has
been of only secondary importance, and that:
We believe it will take a new degree with a new name and 
a new program to declare that teaching is important and 
will be equally rewarded and that the narrower speciali­
zation of the past will not dominate so much of higher 
e d u c a t i o n . 0
The degree would not require original research, but would 
instead call for an extensive independent presentation in 
which the ability to master and present a complex body of 
knowledge would be demonstrated. It would be the standard 
liberal arts advanced degree, the Doctor of Arts, from which 
one could proceed to the Doctor of Philosophy through the 
satisfactory completion of original research. Notwithstand­
ing, it should be treated as equal to the Doctor of
l^This definition was inspired by John Dewey, in 
Democracy and Education (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1966), pp. 180-193.
^®Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Less Time, More Options : 
Education Beyond High School (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company! 1971), p. 17.
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Philosophy in the determination of salary, promotion, and
21other perquisites.
The Commission argues that the training of "Ph. D's. 
for community college teachers should be actively discour­
aged. The research-oriented Ph. D. is highly inappropriate 
for the community college teacher." Indeed the holders of
the research degree are described as having a "trained 
22incapacity" for serving in these positions. The Commis­
sion does not explain this point of view, nor does it argue 
for it. This must either be accepted on the Commission's 
authority or as common knowledge. Though a popular argu­
ment, verifiable in principle, this can easily represent a 
case of taking opinion as fact. No research evidence has 
been cited in support of it.
The mastery of subject matter and the demonstrated 
ability to present it are therefore accepted as superior 
prerequisites to good teaching more than the successful 
experience of systematic and organized discovery. This 
preference is carried over into the Commission's assumptions 
about instruction. Educational psychology and learning 
theory might be a desirable component of the Doctor of Arts 
program, but on the whole, "there is no reason to alter the 




preparation." A degree program so designed is assumed to 
offer within it that which is necessary "to learn the art 
of teaching."23 It follows that teaching is basically a 
matter of presentation, though not necessarily according to 
tradition.
One full policy statement is given over to the sub­
ject of instructional technology, the full incorporation of 
which into the instructional process is strongly endorsed. 
This does not mean that the teacher must be an expert as to
its use, though he should know something of its various 
24capabilities. He is to be assisted by an instructional 
technologist whose responsibility it is to know the relative 
effectiveness of various technologies to given situations, 
and advise and assist in the preparation of their use. 
According to the recommendation the instructional technolo­
gist, with an information specialist who knows the "soft­
ware" of media technology, should serve with the teacher
ORas an instructional t e a m . ^
It is the technologist who is expected to have the 
knowledge of educational psychology and learning theory, 
and is responsible for a knowledge also of instructional
23Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, The Fourth Revolution; 
Instructional Technology in Higher Education (New York; 




strategy. The doctorate is desirable for him though a 
masters’ degree is acceptable. Still, the teacher is the 
leader of the team, for it is he ’’who understands best 
what needs to be taught.” Technology basically assists 
the presentation.
Electronic and mechanical instruments of instruc­
tion are the ’’given” condition of the Commission’s approach. 
They are valued for convenience and flexibility —  off- 
campus, independent study, individualized instruction, and 
nonscheduled supplementary tutorial instruction. They are 
valued as an innovation. However, reference is made to 
hundreds of studies that show the use of sophisticated 
electronic and mechanical technology not to be, in their 
effect, ’’significantly different from that of ’good profes­
sors, and teachers using conventional modes of instruc­
tion.’”^^ The Commission decides to believe an authority 
to its own liking, who argues that these findings ”fly in
ODthe face of common sense,” and that current research 
simply does not measure some of the advantages of the new 
media. It is hardly convincing when research findings are 
dismissed in so perfunctory a manner. Moreover one of the
26%bid., p. 71.
^^Ibid., p. 13 (see note)
28 Ibid., quoting Anthony Oetinger in ’’Will Infor­
mation Technologies Help Learning?”, an unpublished manu­
script at the time of the quotation (1972).
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Commission's own sponsored research reports is quoted as
finding that the use of technology requires more rather than
less of an instructor's time. Other reports are cited
showing the same results. Yet the technology is taken as
29being superior.
In principle, the Commission has taken a position 
which may be consistent with certain theories of learning, 
even though its approach appears to be mechanistic. The 
Commission is concerned with the most efficient way of 
presenting the information, more with convenience than 
effect. It is in error rejecting research findings without 
marshalling evidence equally as formidable as that which it 
is confronting. In the face of evidence the Commission 
makes contrary assumption as to fact. Such assumptions do 
not have empirical significance. Accordingly the Commis­
sion's point of view is not sound. Neither is there any ac­
count of the principle of learning as an autonomous function,
If not in the training for the professorial guild, 
or the mechanics of its practice, then perhaps in its 
evaluation will the free and independent end of learning be 
perceived as cause for its own perpetuation. Repeated 
references are made in The Fourth Revolution to evaluation, 
but with the relegation of this important function to the
29lbid., p. 66, quoting Howard Brown and Gordon 
Douglass in Efficiency in Liberal Education: A Study of 
Comparative Instructional Costs for Different Ways of 
Organizing Teaching-Learning in a Liberal Arts College 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), p. 27.
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learning technologist, who is himself a subordinate on the
instructional team. How evaluation is to be integrated into
the instructional strategy, if in fact this is to be a part
30of the strategy, is not clear. Presumably the purpose of
evaluation is to measure the adequacy of the instructional
effort at some logical sequence. Also, presumably, it is
for the purpose of making possible some improvement in the
learning process. In point of fact there is no indication
as to how evaluation relates to the instructor, the course,
the students, or all three.
Major importance is attached to evaluation of
instruction in a policy statement issued in the same month
as The Fourth Revolution. Acording to this publication,
Reform on Campus, "greater emphasis on the prestige and art
of teaching" is encouraged. The Commission asserts that:
This reemphasis depends, in part, upon thé evaluation 
placed on the importance of teaching. This evaluation 
includes the ways in which institutions are graded in 
the hierarchy of quality, and particularly whether 
teaching performance is one of the rating criteria. 
Important also is the reward given to superior teachers 
as compared with other teachers and as compared, also, 
with those who engage heavily in research.*!
This is a very deceiving reference in that the term "evalu­
ation" is used in a way that grammatically has nothing to 
do with the evaluation of teaching performance. It has
30 Ibid., p. 71.
3!carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Reform on Campus: Changing 
Students, Changing Academic Programs (New York; McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1972), p. 48.
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instead to do with the evaluation of the importance of 
teaching. If this is interpolated to mean the relative 
importance of teaching or its rank in the order of institu­
tional priorities, then the above quote begins to make sense 
grammatically. As to the hierarchy of quality, it is not 
clear whether this is a criterion reference pertaining to 
departments within an institution or to a comparative rating 
of separate institutions. In either case the reference to 
"quality" introduces antecedent assumptions as to principle 
which this analysis has discovered to be of indeterminate 
meaning. The one clear reference is to the relative rewards 
to superior teachers and researchers.
Confusing though it already is, the same paragraph
continues as follows:
Teaching, however, is notoriously difficult to evalu­
ate —  it is an art more than a science. Beyond the 
standard methods —  examination of syllabi, observations 
of classes and seminars, and others —  we have six 
suggestions to make.3%
The term "evaluation" is now being used according to its 
generally accepted reference. By taking it to mean that 
which it is supposed to mean, one might expect to derive a 
notion of the Commission’s conception of the state of the 
art, both as to teaching and its evaluation. But the "six 
suggestions" offered to make the evaluation not so notori­
ously difficult spoil this possibility. They are:
S^Ibid., p. 48.
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The incorporation of students into the evaluation 
process . . . .
Differential assignments of teaching load in universi­
ties . . . .
Policies that allow superior teachers to rise more near­
ly to as high salary levels as superior research persons
Establishment of Doctor of Arts and Master of Philosophy 
degrees . . . .
A greater emphasis on awards to honor outstanding 
teachers . . . .
CreatioggOf teaching funds to parallel research funds
If we examine the above suggestions in order to 
determine how they are to be of help in the task of evalua­
ting teaching, we discover that only the first has anything 
to do with it. The rest have instead to do with rewards, 
incentives, and priorities.
The recommendation to incorporate students into the 
evaluation process is an action that is still once removed 
from the process. This point can be illustrated by simply 
asking. What will be the criteria and strategy of the 
students? The Commission hardly perceives the process of 
evaluation as having moved beyond the level of relatively 
informed or uninformed opinion, or a generally subjective 
tradition. Neither is it perceived that evaluation can be
SSlbid., pp. 48-49.
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built into the ongoing process of lesson preparation and 
presentation, or that performance results might be measured 
against predetermined objectives. Evaluation, as perceived 
by the Commission, is taken as necessary. It is not, 
however, sufficiently understood to be an effective measure 
of performance against results —  at any level. This term, 
vague and inconsistent as to meaning, has gone the way of 
quality; hence, no empirical significance.
Given a definition of evaluation clearly related to 
the measurement or assessment of performance, the "six 
suggestions" offered in connection with this have no logical 
significance. They represent instead fallacies of rele­
vance, for the conclusions to which they lead represent 
something other than that which the suggestions purport.
Summary as to the Nature and Scope of Higher Education
A fundamental treatment of the inherent logic of the 
relationship of learning and knowledge, considered in and of 
itself, escapes the reader. An analysis of the discussions 
in which this would most likely emerge results in a miscel­
lany of inconsistent and shifting meanings. Not even the 
meaning of higher education remains constant. The meaning 
of a degree as a certificate of what one has accomplished is
^^The particular fallacy committed here is known as 
ignoratio elenchi, or the irrelevant conclusion. See Irving 
M. Copi, Introduction to Logic (3rd ed.; New York: The Mac­
millan Company, 1968), p. *72.
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lost in its treatment as an employment credential. A sub­
stantial amount of research data is rejected because it does 
not conform to "common sense." The Commission's understand­
ing of evaluation becomes confused through vague and incon­
sistent use and contradictions in logic. The Commission has 
been preoccupied with superficiality, mechanics, and issues 
best left to experts in their respective fields.
Recommendations for the Future;
A Call for Reform
The Commission's call for reform in higher education 
has proved to be of singular interest to this analysis, 
though not because the Commission has addressed itself to 
the nature of knowledge as knowledge, and what might thus be 
implied for the means to attaining it, nor any relationship 
of subject to method as though the former should suggest the 
latter. Neither is the call for reform of interest because 
the Commission suggests, as to research, any known or 
presumed relationship between the unknown and the organized, 
intelligent approach to it. Much less has the Commission 
studied the matter and reported on the presence or absence 
of any such relationships. To be sure, the means and ends 
of learning, aside from any utilitarian applications of 
knowledge, are not perceived as placing any dictates upon 
resource and governance considerations.
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The Commission's call for reform is of singular 
interest because it reports the Commission's own exercise of 
means to ends, of research which purports to discover, thus 
making possible the examination of the Commission's own 
assumptions as to the relationship of the means and ends of 
learning, of method to subject, according to its own 
approach to one such matter. On the basis of this exercise 
of means to the end of knowledge it can be determined if 
predicative learning (as method), and substantive learning 
(as knowledge), can be taken together as having any pre­
supposed integrity aside from utilitarian considerations.
Presumably the Commission's object was to determine
the general opinions of certain groups on a number of issues
pertaining to higher education. Its method was that of a
questionnaire returned by 70,772 undergraduates, 32,963
graduate students, and 60,028 members of faculties. The
Commission reports that certain procedures were followed in
order to assure random selection, both in the gathering and
35processing of the questionnaire results.
This survey indicated among those participating a 
high level of satisfaction with higher education in the 
United States at that time (1971), and certainly higher than 
had been considered to be the case during the latter part
35 Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Reform on Campus: Changing 
Students, Changing Academic Programs (New York; McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1972), p. 69.
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of the decade of the sixties. At the same time the survey 
indicated several changes in practice desired by those 
returning the questionnaires. Both faculty and students 
were in agreement as to an emphasis on teaching effective­
ness rather than research as the primary criterion for 
faculty promotion. They were also in agreement as to a 
greater emphasis on the relevance of course work to contem­
porary life and problems, and to more attention to the 
emotional growth of students. There was also partial agree­
ment on the desire for a broad liberal education as opposed 
to more specialized training. Another area of partial 
agreement not figuring so importantly in this analysis is 
that of required community service for a fixed period 
applying to all young people after the completion of high 
school but not necessarily before entering college. The 
Commission reports two areas of disagreement on the part of 
the respondents —  the abolition of grades and the adoption 
of an all-elective system.3® The Commission’s interpreta­
tion of that which represents partial agreement on the one 
hand, and disagreement on the other, will subsequently be 
given closer attention.
Certain recommendations for reform are offered as 
following these findings. Accordingly the notion of revolu­
tionary change is rejected as not justified, given the high
S^ibid., pp. 9-17.
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degree of satisfaction with the current status of American
37higher education. To the contrary selective reforms are
proposed, as for example the making of teaching performance
"the basic criterion for rewards to faculty members" except
in those institutions in which research is of equal or
38greater importance. Other recommendations purport to 
encourage more relevance in the curriculum.^®
The Commission's treatment, interpretation, and 
recommendations pertaining to these findings are matters 
subject to question. This holds for its judgment as to 
that which constitutes partial agreement and disagreement 
in the total number of responses to certain questions, 
certain assumptions as to the meaning of key terms, and 
certain assumptions as to fact.
First, consider the Commission's judgment concern­
ing that which constitutes statistical agreement and dis­
agreement. On one point —  whether or not there should be 
more emphasis on a broad liberal education —  fifty-six 
percent of the faculty and thirty seven percent of the 
students responding to the questionnaire agree that there 
should be. Presumably, because a majority of the faculty 
and only a minority of the students agree, the Commission
3 ?Ibid., p. 16 
S B lbid., p. 50.
3®Ibid., p. 48.
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draws the conclusion that this represents partial agreement. 
But on the next question —  whether or not all grades should 
be abolished —  the percentages are roughly reversed. A 
majority of the students, with fifty-nine percent agreeing, 
and only a minority of faculty, with thirty-three percent 
agreeing, represent responses which the Commission describes 
as being in disagreement. Given only the data and the 
Commission’s conclusions as to partial agreement and disa­
greement, it appears that each conclusion is a function of 
how faculty has responded. It is difficult to understand 
how student responses may have been taken into account on 
one question and not the other.
The reported findings cannot be taken as supporting 
the Commission’s conclusion in the one case and not the 
other. A fallacy has been committed. Also, the Commission 
either selected an arbitrary differential expressed in 
percentage points for determining that which is partial 
agreement as opposed to disagreement without telling the 
reader, or simply acted according to its preference for 
certain conclusions. Through the ignoring, either partially 
or completely, of one category of response —  the response 
of students —  a hasty generalization has been made/*l
40lbid., p. 15.
Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, I960), p. 68. The hasty generali­
zation is technically known as "converse accident."
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That this was done on behalf of a preconceived notion is 
open to question.
One set of problems incorporating assumptions as to 
meaning as well as to fact emerges in the Commission's 
treatment of the first of these two questionnaire respon­
ses —  the "partial agreement [sic]]" that there be greater 
emphasis on a "broad liberal education." The terminology of 
"general education" and "liberal education" is rejected.
The notion of a "broad learning experience" is offered in 
its place, though the Commission never makes clear how this 
proposal is related to the findings of the survey/*^
But antecedent to these problems is one that derives 
from the Commission's use of the term "relevance," which 
also was a subject of one of the questionnaire items. 
Respondents were reported in agreement as to the need of 
more relevance in course work to contemporary life and its 
problems. After having circulated the questionnaire, the 
Commission offers its own definition of relevance as 
follows :
"Relevance" in the curriculum means different things to 
different people, but a good working definition might 
be: Courses that relate directly to actual personal 
interests of students and to current societalproblems.43
42Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Reform on Campus: Changing 
Students, Changing Academic Programs (Hew York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1972), pp. 41-45.
43lbid., p. 45.
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In other references the Commission's opinion of that which 
is relevant is identified. Programs relating to ethnic 
groups are included, more emphasis on the performing arts 
for an affluent society more given to leisure, and problem 
oriented courses as contrasted to discipline oriented 
courses. Of particular importance to the Commission is the 
role to be played by new perspectives as for example a 
"comparative world view of culture.
Having confided that "relevance" means different 
things to different people, it is rather puzzling that the 
Commission proceeds to propose certain program areas as 
relevant —  as though definitions and illustrations after 
the fact represent accurately that which respondents to the 
questionnaire had in mind at the time they reacted to the 
item. Granted, the Commission's definition corresponded 
closely to the questionnaire item. That definition was 
nonetheless general, and cannot be taken as supporting the 
Commission's opinion in particular cases. This represents 
a fallacy of relevance, in that the conclusions offered 
cannot be taken as those of the sample, which in turn have 
no logical significance for the specific illustrations 
offered.
Just as perplexing is the treatment of the subject 
matter of the undergraduate curricular offerings of recent
44ibid., p. 46.
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years. Opinion was first expressed on this matter in A 
Chance to Learn, published just two years before the report 
of the survey in Reform on Campus. In the earlier report 
reference was made to the "conventional undergraduate neo­
classical education"'^® as though this were the standard 
pattern at the time. The Commission was assuming that the 
rapidly approaching realization of universal access to 
higher education would result in an influx of students for 
whom a curriculum so described would be inappropriate, and 
on this basis stated that some changes would have to be 
m a d e .
Though it may be true that the conventional under­
graduate education may be inappropriate for certain stu­
dents, the further assumption that such education is neo­
classical is open to challenge. A brief review of many of 
the disciplines incorporated into the programs of general 
education in most colleges and universities will illustrate 
this point. Sociology and psychology, as disciplines, made 
their appearance in the nineteenth century in American 
colleges and universities. Economics and political science, 
both of which developed out of political economy, also made 
their first known appearance in American higher education 
in the nineteenth century. Physics, chemistry, and biology
45carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, A Chance to Learn; An Action 
Agenda for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education (New York; 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 12.
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were first generally accepted into the curriculum during 
this same p e r i o d . Indeed the burden of proof that the 
basic English composition required of virtually all college 
freshmen is neoclassical rests with those who would so 
contend. To argue that curricula largely made up of these 
courses is neoclassical serves only to identify it with 
real or presumed antecedents. This is roughly the same as 
saying that higher education has a history just as western 
civilization has a history. In the age of mass communica­
tion, computerized information processing, science, engi­
neering, and technology, one is hard put also to discard
these disciplines as totally irrelevant.
In Reform on Campus the Carnegie Commission again
approaches this same issue, and somewhat more thoroughly.
Having reported as one of its findings some preference for a 
"broad liberal education," to use the language of the 
questionnaire, the Commission rejects "general education" 
and "liberal education" on the grounds that "it carries with 
it connotations of past efforts at a general coverage of all 
essential knowledge. . . .We prefer the concept of a 'broad 
learning experience.*" The Commission declares that 
"despite repeated efforts over the past 70 years," such 
coverage is impossible. "Essential knowledge no longer has
^®Frederick Rudolph, The American College and Uni- 
versity (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. Il3, 365, and 
405.
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the intellectual (classical) and/or theological core that
once allowed a student to cover it all in one college 
47career."
The Commission has so interpreted the meaning of 
"liberal education" that it has cut its discussion, and 
recommendations also, entirely away from the questionnaire 
reference to a "broad liberal education." It has repeated 
the same fallacy of relevance that was observed in connec­
tion with the term "relevance." The Commission’s conclu­
sions and recommendations cannot be taken as having a 
significant relation in fact or in logic to the opinions of 
the respondents to the questionnaire.
To be sure the Commission is more thorough in Reform
on Campus than in A Chance to Learn, but still its discus­
sion is ever so brief. The concept of essential knowledge 
is rejected for program planning but not in and of itself. 
The intellectual is equated with the classical, but for 
reasons that escape the reader. Moreover a so-called clas­
sical or theological core is taken as a necessary condition 
for essential knowledge to be covered in one college career. 
All this is reported in just a few sentences.
If the Commission was able to support this point of 
view with any facts it certainly did not do so at the time
^^Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Reform on Campus; Changing 
Students, Changing Academic Programs (New York; McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1972), p. 42.
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of writing. To the contrary it expresses another point of
view in this same volume hardly consistent with these
assumptions, as follows:
A century ago, higher education in the United States was 
"modernized" to reflect the new role of science, the 
rapid industrial advance of the nation, the surging 
populism of the people.4°
Higher education is taken at the same time to be neoclas­
sical in its undergraduate education and also populist.
These apparent differences could be reconciled with refer­
ence to separate points in time if it were not for the fact 
that the so-called modernization were assumed to be a task 
completed. They could in principle be reconciled in other 
ways if information to do so were provided.
Nor is this important to the Commission, for the 
real test of academic program comes in another way, which 
can be demonstrated by following another line of reasoning 
on which the Commission bases certain recommendations. 
Following upon the claim that in the nineteenth century 
higher education was "modernized" the Commission argues that 
now it:
needs to be more completely "humanized" in the sense of
(a) being made more accessible to more young people, and
(b) of being further adapted to the individual charac­
teristics and attributes of its students.*9
The situation for which this is offered as a corrective is 
^ ^ Ibid., p. 1.
49lbid.
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described as the trend toward "homogenization" —  toward 
a standard image for all institutions, as private colleges 
have become public, the single-sex coeducational, the 
church-related college toward non-sectarianism, as the 
smaller colleges became comprehensive colleges, with
research and specialization becoming the capstones of this
^ 50 trend.
Diversity of program and differentiation of func­
tions for separate institutions are seen as the correctives 
for this situation. Istitutions should no longer follow the 
research university model as the only model, but seek to 
establish their separate identities. That instead of:
merely trying to match the accomplishments of other 
[institutions^ . . . each should seek to perfect its 
own separate institutional personality, that each should 
strive to excel according to its own standards, and that 
different is better.51 (Emphasis added.)
The Commission thus makes a value judgment aside from 
quality as a characteristic of a given instructor's perform­
ance or an institution's degree standards. Quality becomes 
a measure of (1) the extent of innovation, diversity, and 
differentiation, and (2) humanization as this term is under­
stood by the Commission. These goals are not to be achieved 
by a fixed plan of courses. Recommended instead is the 




the final test of which will be the market. Ultimately, 
market demand will then determine program, for "the ideal 
combination is a policy that promotes diversity encouraged 
by and tested by the free play of the market."5%
The Commission recommends a broad learning experi­
ence in place of general education or liberal education, 
on the grounds that heretofore such programs are pre­
selected on faculty authority and carry "unpleasant impli-
53cations of morality." The scientific method, the creative 
performance, policy formulation, exploration, and discovery 
are suggested alternatives to the traditional pattern.
These would be an improvement, so the Commission argues, 
because they place emphasis not on preselected content but 
on ways to approach knowledge.
The analysis thus returns to the point of departure 
for this section. The Carnegie Commission has made its own 
approach in search of knowledge, then supplied definitions 
of key terms that severed its argument from the findings.
The Commission has arrived at irrelevant conclusions as to 
that which is meant by "relevant," has introduced precon­
ceived notions of that which is meant by "liberal" educa­




position that the market is the ideal determinant of 
program. One cannot expect to detect in the midst of such 
inconsistency, contradiction, and fallacy an appreciation of 
the means and ends of knowledge independently considered.
Summary of Chapter Eight
With much evidence to the contrary, the policy 
statements were searched in an effort to determine if learn­
ing is in any way perceived as an autonomous set of func­
tions, and according to which the nature of learning would
54determine the means to its acquisition. The observation 
was made in Chapter Seven that complete and unqualified 
autonomy, with knowledge as its own ultimate end, was taken 
by the Commission as a hypothetical condition that does not 
in fact exist nor should exist. Yet learning could in 
principle exist as its own end in the penultimate sense in 
that circumscribed autonomy, or independence as the Commis­
sion preferred, was endorsed. The purpose of Chapter Eight 
was to determine if this could indeed be the case given the 
Commission's conception of the nature and scope of higher 
education, its cultural relationships, and the Commission's 
understanding of the learning process. The latter involved 
an analysis of the recommendations as to degrees,
54 Supra, p. 104.
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preparation for the college teacher, and especially the 
Commission's own approach to discovery.
The analysis has demonstrated that though the term 
"culture" was occasionally used with unclear meaning, the 
actual relationship of higher education to society is 
consistently perceived as economic. Aside from market 
expectations there is no understanding of higher education 
which is built upon the work ethic. The degree is a cer­
tificate of employment. Even though the Commission consid­
ers this interpretation of the degree as an unfortunate 
development, it offers no opinion of that which a degree 
should represent.
The Commission-perceives that more young people are 
abandoning the Horatio Alger syndrome than ever before, and 
because this is taken to be the case higher education is 
left uncertain as to its future mission; which is to say 
that cultural models other than the economic are incongru- 
ent with higher education as it is now constituted.
The analysis has determined thatthe policy state­
ments of the Carnegie Commission are also confused as to the 
nature and scope of higher education. Generally accepted 
definitions do not consistently hold; moreover, the Commis­
sion proposes that higher education be defined to embrace 
all postsecondary education, and again that postsecondary 
education be subdivided into higher education and further 
education. Wolfe's charge that the Commission was selective
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in its definition of terms not only has been demonstrated,
but also the Commission is inconsistent and sometimes 
5 5inaccurate. This holds particularly for such expressions 
as "general education," "liberal education," and the 
"traditional neoclassical undergraduate education." 
Accordingly, one cannot assume a generally accepted defini­
tion as applying to any of the technical terminology of 
academe.
Much less can it be assumed that a principle of 
collegiality prevails in the community of the learned and 
the learning, or that such a community is necessarily 
ordered by the nature of knowledge or the means of its 
acquisition. Every discussion proceeds from utilitarian 
assumptions. Even in the case of the Commission’s recom­
mendations as to the direction that undergraduate education 
should take —  they are beside the point, because the market 
is the final judge of that which courses of instruction and 
degree programs should be.
The means and ends of instruction have been taken 
for granted. The principles of research, which according to 
the analytical model would represent predicative learning in 
the purest sense, may have been carefully employed except 
for the interpretation of the findings. These were circum­
vented in part, though not necessarily by intention, by
SSgupra, p. 11.
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definitions rendering the findings of no consequence to the 
Commission’s point of view. Preconceived notions, more than 
the findings of the questionnaires returned, have determined 
the nature of that which was labelled a "broad learning 
experience."
The discussion of evaluation, according to which the 
means and ends of learning are brought ipto necessary 
relation, was carried astray by a repetition of fallacy.
Instructional technology may truly have advantages 
that have escaped the studies that have been conducted, but 
the reader cannot be expected to accept this on the Commis­
sion's authority.
Learning as an independent function, with its own 
logic and assumptions as to principle, can hardly be seri­
ously considered as a real possibility for a group that has 
violated its logic and principles. If learning cannot be 
taken as dictating the means to its own end, it cannot be 
taken as being penultimate as to purpose —  autonomous in 
the determination of its methods and its findings but taken 
at the same time to be socially useful. Hence the nature of 
learning and its inherent requirements have only a contin­
gent significance for the Commission's recommendations.
They are contingent upon budgetary restrictions, the number 




Chapter One set forth the problem statement of 
this study as follows: To what extent has the Carnegie
Commission on the Future of Higher Education accomplished 
its task through the exercise of sound principles, con­
sistent use of theoretical constructs or models; or if 
not, then to what extent have its policy statements been 
influenced by unsupported assumptions as to fact, value 
judgments, and incomplete or fallacious arguments?
Chapter Three concluded with a proposal that unstated 
assumptions, in the absence of a theoretical approach, 
could well determine the point of view of the Commission's 
policy statements and recommendations.
The analysis has demonstrated that assumptions as 
to meaning, as to fact, and as to principle have been the 
controlling factors for the Carnegie Commission's point 
of view. These assumptions have not been stated but 
instead have been taken for granted. Truth as to fact and 
soundness as to principle have been taken for granted,
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with the result that meanings and relationships are left 
uncertain. Uncertainty as to meaning has been observed in 
the Commission's use of the term "quality"; uncertainty of 
relationship in the discussion of quality and equality as 
interacting principles.
The most serious and influential of the Commission's
assumptions is of a different nature. Chapter Two pointed
out that Birnbaum took notice of the Commission's fondness
1for economic figures. The true significance of this evi­
dently escaped Birnbaum's notice, for the fundamental 
presupposition of the Carnegie Commission is economic. 
Courses and instructional programs are treated as though 
they are commodities, the demands of students as market 
forces, and costs as a maximum allowable percentage of the 
Gross National Product.
One cannot say that this economic point of departure 
is a model in the theoretical sense. It is a presupposi­
tion. It has determined the nature of the discussion, the 
nature of the internal and external relationships of higher 
education as perceived by the Commission, and the conclu­
sions and recommendations. But the economic presupposition 
has not been set forth as an instrument of analysis, nor 
examined for its strengths or weaknesses. Neither has this 
presupposition been used to test any research hypotheses,
^Supra, p. 14.
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to accept or reject any proposition, even any hunch. This 
presupposition or set of assumptions is not even declared, 
much less defined, or supported with argument. It is a 
presupposition —  not a model —  simply because it is taken 
to be a priori.
Had such a model been adequately presented with the 
necessary definitions of terms, the appropriate delimita­
tions, and consciously used as an analytical or research 
design, that model may have proved most fruitful. But as a 
presupposition the economic point of view must be taken 
instead as a value judgment. The validity of this presup­
position thus becomes a function of belief, of commitment 
aside from the question of evidence or a matter of demon­
stration. The economic point of departure therefore is to 
be accepted on the Commission's authority, this contextual 
setting of the problems of higher education on the Commis­
sion's authority, and their solution on the Commission's 
authority. Though cogent in principle the economic model 
is not so in the Commission's use of it, and only because 
of the failure to demonstrate its strengths and weaknesses 
with facts that stand independent of the Commission's 
prestige and commitment to it.
Economic incentives are advanced as the solution to 
problems. This holds in the case of equality of opportunity 
which is to be assured through the provision of grants,
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loans, and work-study programs, as was noted in Chapter 
2Five. The analysis has demonstrated that the rationale was 
as much economic as any other, and that social justice was 
perceived as participation in the ’’better life,” the afflu­
ent life. Economic justification was pursued to some 
detail. A case in point had to do with policies for the 
repayment of loans made to medical students for the financ­
ing of their training. In this connection the reasonable 
proposal was made that students enlisted in a national 
health service corps would receive forgiveness of twenty- 
five percent of their maximum allowable indebtedness in 
return for two years service. But at the same time mothers 
of pre-school children would be excused from obligations to 
repay indebtedness so long as their children remained in 
this age bracket, and provided they ’’work half-time in the 
labor market.”3 in order to keep people productive in the 
economic sense the Commission is overlooking other important 
values —  in this case the care of small children.
If the economic precondition —  a materialistic 
social determinism —  is to apply to all decisions, then it 
is possible in principle that it will apply to non-material
^Supra, p. 59.
3Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Educa­
tion, Report of the Commission, Higher Education and the 
Nation's Health; Policies for Medical and Dental Education 
(New York; McGraw-Éill Book Company, 19VÔ), p. 69.
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social values. No less than the social and moral develop­
ment of the pre-school child, the educational process 
throughout, even at the graduate level is fundamentally 
non-materialistic. In the final analysis, learning and 
knowing are functions of the mind.
Further analysis of the Commission’s own illustra­
tion will demonstrate how this may take place. If for 
example the mother of the pre-school child elects to forego 
employment because she considers her offspring deserving of 
the sacrifice, she is further denied forgiveness of a 
proportion of her loan. Economic policy has dictated her 
order of priorities. This represents a value judgment, and 
is subject to further justification than the Commission's 
opinion in the matter.
In a similar fashion the Commission has imposed 
restrictions of an economic nature on higher education. It 
proposes extensive subsidization for large numbers of stu­
dents on the one hand, thus converting potential into 
kinetic demand; and on the other hand asserts that the 
resources to meet this increased demand must be restricted 
to an amount not significantly greater than two and one-half 
percent of the Gross National Product. As was pointed out 
in Chapter Six, this results in shifting much of the burden 
for the lower division of college to high school, to non- 
traditional programs —  the military. Educational Testing 
Service, and the American College Testing Program. The
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Commission takes for granted that those functions of the 
mind involving the kinds of experience and memory that we 
call learning can operate within these restrictions without 
the loss of quality. Though the term "quality" is, as has 
been demonstrated, of indeterminate meaning, it has been 
seen to have reference in part to that which has been the 
norm. Likewise that which has been taken as sufficient for 
the recent past is further taken as sufficient for the 
immediate future.
That the Commission's own macroeconomic and micro- 
economic assumptions are congruent has not been demonstra­
ted —  that a given percentage of the Gross National Product 
will be equal to the costs to be imposed by the demands of 
individuals for college training. At the same time the 
economic presupposition is the logically significant prior 
cause for the Commission's stance, and as such represents 
a self-perpetuating set of conditions. Any free, indepen­
dent, and critical role for higher education is accordingly 
circumscribed by the economic presupposition.
Neither has the Commission demonstrated that the 
means and ends of learning can be adequately met within the 
economic restrictions that the recommendations have imposed. 
To be sure the Commission's own misunderstanding of quality 
as a performance criterion, its own misuse of the method of 
the higher learning, and fallacies of relevance in the 
discussion of evaluation, are sufficient to discredit it as
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an authority. Yet it is on the Commission's authority that 
the reader is to accept the Commission's list of opinions.
The economic presupposition is applied to the exclu­
sion of the functions of learning independently considered. 
This is as much in error as it is for the manufacturer of 
automobiles to disregard the relative strength of materials 
and compression ratios in relation to one another aside from 
market consideration in order to determine if a satisfactory 
product can be built. Moreover the cost to manufacture a 
satisfactory product is as much a market factor as demand. 
The same may in principle hold for higher education.
The economic presupposition, not just because it is 
pervasive but because it is followed to the subordination, 
and in certain cases the virtual exclusion of alternatives 
to it, represents the bias of the Carnegie Commission on 
the Future of Higher Education. If in the preparation of 
its policy statements the Commission had accepted the 
limitations of an economic model, or had it considered and 
weighed a number of alternative approaches to the nature, 
scope, and problems of higher education, this bias need not 
have been present. On this same account the policy state­
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